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The Great War fought between 1914 and 1918 involved each 
and every imperial power and devastated the entire world. In that 
respect, the centenary commemoration generated a disproportion-
ately large attention to the heroic battles in Flanders and the North 
of France. The war experience in the colonies, where European 
powers found the required manpower and resources3, has been 
barely looked at. The African Theatre of War, where Germany 
started its East African Military Campaign to force allied govern-
ments to keep their armed forces and supplies on the dark conti-
nent, generated new interest4. In comparison, the case of the Bel-
gian Congo during the First World War and the key question on 
its neutrality, remains until now largely unexplored5.
1. Adaptation of a quote by Guy Delfosse in : “Soixante-quinze ans d’histoire 
du Congo à travers soixante-quinze ans d’histoire du Journal des tribunaux”, 
in JT, 1960, p. 240-245.
2. We express our thanks to the anonymous reviewers of this article for their 
valuable suggestions.
3. Colonial powers increased the mining of gold, diamond and copper to keep 
the war machine running. Especially the copper mines in the Katanga province 
served for the production of shells fired at the European front.
4. Byron Farwell, The Great War in Africa, 1914-1918, New York, 1986 ; 
Melvin Page, Africa and the First World War, New York, 2014 ; anne SaMSon, 
World War I in Africa : the Forgotten Conflict Among the European Powers 
(International library of twentieth century history, 50), London, 2012 ; 
Hew StracHan, The First World War in Africa, Oxford/New York, 2004 ; 
gordon Mcgregor and MannFred goldBeck, Keine Chance : der Erste Weltkrieg 
in Namibia, August 1914-July 1915, Windhoek, 2014.
5. enika ngongo (University of Saint Louis, Brussels) prepares a doctoral 
thesis on the war experience in the Belgian Congo. See also : lucaS catHerine, 
Loopgraven in Afrika (1914-1918) : de vergeten oorlog van de Congolezen 
tegen de Duitsers, Berchem, 2013.
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I. Introduction
The recent wave of international scholarship on 
the neutrality doctrine directly inspired this contri-
bution : Isabel Hull’s monograph A Scrap of Paper 
covers the classical discussion on the actual vio-
lation of neutrality6. Maartje Abbenhuis produced 
a synthetic monograph on neutrality as the stand-
ard political attitude – and not the exception – 
in 19th century great power politics7. Finally, the 
early modern origins of the concept have been 
thoroughly examined by Eric Schnakenbourg8. 
The present contribution does not concern the 
question of the violation of Belgian (and a pre-
sumed Congolese) neutrality by Germany and 
leaves issues as the German ultimatum or the 
alleged necessity-principle outside the scope. 
Instead, it enquires whether the legal and concep-
tual foundations of permanent neutrality were as 
solid as a genealogic approach to international 
law as a vector of peace would suggest. Further-
more, an objective understanding of the discus-
sion – if possible at all – has to discard 19th century 
Belgian nationalism9.
6. iSaBel v. Hull, A Scrap of Paper : Beaking and Making International Law during the Great War, Ithaca/London 2014, 
p. 16-50. See also : cHriStoPH waMPacH, “Der Rechtsstreit um die Verletzung der belgischen Neutralität im Ersten Weltkrieg”, 
in Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abteilung, 2016, p. 404-439 ; kirSten SellarS, 
“The First World War, Wilhelm II and Article 227 : the Origin of the Idea of ‘Aggression’ in International Criminal Law”, 
in clauS kreSS and SteFan Barriga (eds.), The Crime of Aggression : A Commentary, Cambridge, 2016, p. 30-60 ; vincent genin, 
Un “laboratoire belge” du droit international (1869-1940) ? Réseaux internationaux, expériences et mémoires de guerre 
des juristes belges, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Liège, 2017, p. 347-373.
7. Maartje aBBenHuiS, An Age of Neutrals : Great Power Politics, 1815-1914, Cambridge, 2014. On neutral powers outside 
the conflict, see also : alain clavien and claude HauSer, “Les états neutres et la neutralité pendant la Grande Guerre : 
une histoire pas si marginale”, Relations internationales, 2014, n° 159, p. 3-6.
8. eric ScHnakenBourg, Entre la guerre et la paix : neutralité et relations internationales, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles, Rennes, 2013, 
p. 21-73. See also : kentaro wani, Neutrality in International Law : From the Sixteenth Century to 1945 (Routledge Advances 
in International Relations and Global Politics, 131), London, 2017 ; antonella aliMento (ed.), War, Trade and Neutrality : 
Europe and the Mediterranean in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Milano, 2011.
9. E.g. Charles Faider (1811-1893), discours de rentrée at the Court of Cassation, 15 October 1885, as reported in 
the Revue de droit international et de legislation comparée, 1886, p. 89 : “La constitution internationale de la Belgique 
peut s’exprimer par le mot NEUTRALITÉ. Cette neutralité […] fut assurée à la Belgique dès le IXe siècle, parfois violée, 
jamais détruite”. (“The international constitution of Belgium can be summarized with the word ‘neutrality’. This neutrality 
[…] has been guaranteed to Belgium since the 9th century. At times violated, it has never been destroyed”.). jean StengerS and 
eliane guBin, Le Grand Siècle de la nationalité belge (vol 1), Bruxelles, 2002, p. 121-125.
10. guy vantHeMScHe, “The Historiography of Belgian Colonialism in the Congo”, in Csaba Léval (ed.), Europe and the World 
in European Historiography (Thematic Work Group Europe and the World, 1), Pisa, 2006, p. 106.
11. Bérengère Piret, La justice coloniale en procès : organisation et pratique judiciaire, le tribunal de district de Stanleyville 
(1935-1955), unpublished doctoral thesis, University Saint Louis, Bruxelles, 2016 ; Rechtskultur : Zeitschrift für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte, 2016, n° 5, (theme issue on colonial legal history).
12. jacqueS vanderlinden, Les systèmes juridiques africains, Paris, 1983.
13. genin, Un “laboratoire belge” du droit.
14. Martti koSkennieMi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations : the Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960, Cambridge, 2001.
Historiography on Belgian colonialism has wit-
nessed a new blossoming10, whereas legal history, 
except for some interest for the judiciary, lagged 
behind11. Traditionally, the relationship between 
indigenous customary law and colonial law 
attracts the interest of legal theorists and anthro-
pologists12. Little is known about the relation 
between the discursive construction of Belgian 
and Congolese neutrality in both the domestic and 
the European, ‘civilised’ community of lawyers. 
Belgian lawyers played a predominant role as 
forerunners in the development of contemporary 
international law13, which functioned as a brake 
on the so-called ‘positivist’ 19th century law of 
nations. Yet, their writings had not only a descrip-
tive, but also a normative, de lege ferenda design 
(which implies that their writings tended to alter 
the existing state of the law, rather than to merely 
describe it). Our analysis could not remain limited 
to the scholarly publications of the generation of 
the International Law Institute and the Revue de 
droit international et de législation comparée14, 
since both have an international focal point. 
Their views need to be juxtaposed against what 
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lawyers ‘at home’ thought about the neutrality 
question of the Congo and Belgium. An original 
approach to tackle this issue is the study of legal 
periodicals publishing on the neutrality question. 
More than other sources, legal periodicals are 
vectors of law, since they both reflect and shape 
the mentality of its authors, editors and readers15. 
In his research on the reprise du Congo (the take-
over of the Congo), Vincent Viaene mentions the 
undeniable role of Brussels attorneys-at-law, espe-
cially the renowned Edmond Picard (1834-1926)16 
and the Conférence du Jeune Barreau de Bruxelles 
(Brussels Young Bar Association), as a breeding 
ground for Belgium’s colonial party17. Remarka-
bly, he left the Journal des Tribunaux (JT), founded 
by Picard in 1881, which wanted to ‘bring law 
to the people’, aside18. Despite its promise to be 
a-political, this leading legal periodical soon took 
positions in several national and international 
issues, such as the Congo question. Indeed, even 
though the renowned Revue de droit international 
et de legislation comparée (published between 
1869 and 1939) discussed both the neutrality and 
the Congo question, it remained relatively silent 
15. MicHael StolleiS (ed.), Juristische Zeitschriften : Die neue Medien des 18.-20. Jahrhunderts (Studien zur europäischen 
Rechtsgeschichte, 128), Frankfurt am Main, 1999 ; MicHael StolleiS and tHoMaS SiMon (eds.), Juristische Zeitschriften in 
Europa (Studien zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte, 214), Frankfurt am Main, 2006 ; Marju lutS-Sootak and Merike riStikivi, 
“Dear reader”, in Juridica International, 2010, n°17 ; p. 1. On the introduction of human rights in legal practice, 
see : SeBaStiaan vandenBogaerde, “They Entered Without any Rumor : Human Rights in the Belgian Legal Periodicals”, 
in Göttingen Journal of International Law, 2012, n° 1, p. 271-291. On the evolution of Belgian private law, see : dirk HeirBaut, 
“Vijftig jaar privaatrecht in het Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht : Er is in die tijd veel veranderd”, in Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht, 
2014, n° 41, p. 1-71. On the evolution of social law, see : Bruno deBaenSt, “Belgian Social Law and its Journals : 
a Reflected History”, in Cahiers du Centre de Recherches en Histoire du Droit et des Institutions, 2015, n° 37 (https://popups. 
uliege.be/1370-2262/index.php ?id=183), s.p. ; SeBaStiaan vandenBogaerde, Vectoren van het recht : geschiedenis van 
de juridische tijdschriften in België, Brugge, 2018 ; SeBaStiaan vandenBogaerde, “From Mirror to Vector : an Impossible Step ?”, 
Cahiers du Centre de Recherches en Histoire du Droit et des Institutions 2015, n° 37 (https://popups.uliege.be/1370-2262/
index.php ?id=229).
16. Bart coPPein, Dromen van een nieuwe samenleving : intellectuele biografie van Edmond Picard, Brussel, 2011 ; Paul aron 
and cécile vanderPelen-diagre, Edmond Picard : un bourgeois socialiste belge à la fin du dix-neuvième siècle, Bruxelles, 2013 ; 
willy van eeckHoutte and Bruno MaeS (eds.), Genius, grandeur & gêne : het Fin de Siècle rond het Justitiepaleis te Brussel 
en de controversiële figuur van Edmond Picard / La Fin de Siècle autour du Palais de Justice de Bruxelles et le personnage 
d’Edmond Picard, Gent, 2014.
17. vincent viaene, “Reprise-remise : de Congolese identiteitscrisis van België rond 1908”, in Vincent Viaene, 
David Van Reybroeck and Bambi Ceuppens (eds.), Congo in België : koloniale cultuur in de metropool, Leuven, 2009, p. 42-62.
18. SeBaStiaan vandenBogaerde, “‘Une telle apathie est presque coupable’ : How in Belgium’s Journal des Tribunaux the Interest 
for the Congo Free State Sparked Off (1885-1908)”, Clio@Themis, 2017, n° 12, p. 1-15.
19. koSkennieMi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations…, p. 163-164.
20. vandenBogaerde, Vectoren van het recht…, p. 110-136.
21. Bart coPPein, “Bringing Law to the People : the “Journal des Tribunaux” and its First Editor-in-Chief (1881-1900)”, 
Cahiers du Centre de Recherches en Histoire du Droit et des Institutions, 2015, n° 37, (https://popups.uliege.be/1370-2262/
index.php ?id=198).
during the peak years of the Congo controversy19. 
The JT did not, which makes it a perfect medium 
to reconstruct the mentality of Belgium’s lawyers 
at that time.
From the start, Picard’s journal was a resounding 
success and soon thousands of readers turned its 
pages twice a week20. The goal was clear : bringing 
law to the people21. Therefore, it was conceived 
as a tabloid and printed as a newspaper, while 
it deliberately avoided tedious articles, enabling 
readers to be quickly informed about legal news 
whilst having breakfast. Considering the impres-
sive list of Belgian politicians who offered con-
tributions at that time, the JT was probably the 
most influential Belgian legal periodical. The con-
trast with the International Law Institute and its 
Revue could not have been clearer. In the latter’s 
view, only a small circle of international lawyers 
could influence decision-makers. Vulgarization of 
the law was not a primary objective. Moreover, 
the social base of the institute was narrow, while 
the French-German tensions at the turn of the cen-
tury impeded the functioning of both the Institute 
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and the Revue22. Thus, despite its grandeur, the 
effective impact of the Revue on the Belgian legal 
world was smaller than that of the JT.
This contribution juxtaposes the scholarly writ-
ings of Belgian international lawyers and domes-
tic ones. By confronting doctrine, state practice 
and periodicals on international law, it provides 
an insight in the perception among legal practi-
tioners (i.e. attorneys-at-law, notaries, etc) of the 
Congo problem and its impact on the neutrality of 
both Belgium and the Congo. We adopt methods 
from legal history and periodical studies which 
con siders the periodical press an object of study23. 
Since we only scrutinize legal periodicals as vec-
tors of law, archival sources are left out.
At first sight, Belgium and the Congo Free State 
(CFS) lived under an imposed neutrality in 1885, 
which would have explained a swift take-over in 
1909. This article will distinguish both situations, 
and point to the fragilities of clear-cut labelling. 
The status of the CFS in 1885 can hardly be likened 
to that of Belgium in 1839. Conversely, the take-
over as a colony did raise serious questions on the 
extent of the guarantee given by the great powers 
and Belgium’s respect of the obligation to remain 
22. koSkennieMi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations…, p. 18-19.
23. Sean latHaM and roBert ScHoleS, “The Rise of Periodical Studies” in Publications of the Modern Language Association, 
2006, n° 2, p. 517-531 ; HanS BotS and SoPHie levie (eds.), Periodieken en hun kringen : een verkenning van tijdschriften en 
netwerken in de laatste drie eeuwen, Nijmegen, 2006 ; cHriStoPHe verBruggen, Schrijverschap in de Belgische belle époque : 
een sociaal-culturele geschiedenis, Gent, 2009 ; Marianne van reMoortel, kriStin ewinS, Maaike koFFeMan and MattHew 
PHilPottS, “Joining Forces : European Periodical Studies as a New Research Field”, in Journal of European Periodical Studies, 
2016, n° 1, p. 1-3.
24. As a term, the “Belle Époque” find its roots during the Interwar Period and melancholically holds a sentiment to a time 
at the turn of the 19th to 20th centuries, during which technology, discoveries, inventions and economic growth promised 
unlimited prosperity for mankind. No one seems to know exactly when this period started but there is a consensus it ended in 
the Summer of 1914 when of the First World War began. In this contribution, the term Belle Époque refers roughly to the time 
frame 1880-1914. See : MicHel winock, La Belle époque : la France de 1900 à 1914 (Collection Tempus, 44), Paris, 2009.
25. Nys, a pupil of François Laurent, studied law at the universities of Ghent, Heidelberg, Leipzig and Berlin. After a brief stint 
as a lawyer, Nys became a judge, a function he always combined with courses on diplomatic history, history of private law 
and – after Alphone Rivier’s decease – international law. A tireless erudite, Nys spent his summers at the manuscripts section 
of the British Museum. He received honorary doctorates in Edinburgh, Glasgow and Oxford. He was a prolific contributor to 
the Revue de droit international et de législation comparée ; most of his articles dealt with historical (rather than contemporary) 
issues of international law. See : jean SalMon, “Nys, Ernest”, in Nouvelle Biographie Nationale 9, Bruxelles, Académie Royale 
des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgique, 2007, p. 283-285 ; Frederik dHondt, “‘L’histoire, parole vivante du 
droit ?’ François Laurent en Ernest Nys als historiografen van het volkenrecht”, in Bruno Debaenst (eds.), De ‘Belle Époque’ 
van het Belgisch recht (1870-1914), Brugge, 2016, p. 91-115.
26. edouard deScaMPS, La neutralité de la Belgique au point de vue historique, diplomatique, juridique et politique : étude sur 
la Constitution des États pacifiques à titre permanent, Bruxelles, 1902 ; Romain Yakemtchouk, “Descamps (Edouard-François-
Eugène, baron)”, in Biographie Nationale 41, Bruxelles, 1979, col. 198-246.
neutral in any case, including situations where 
conflicts could be engendered in an indirect way. 
Over time, the neutrality issue has been discussed 
by international and domestic lawyers alike.
The dialogue between published and handwrit-
ten diplomatic correspondence, treaty texts and 
doctrinal treatises reaffirms the importance of the 
‘classical’ law of nations doctrine in determining 
the role of the Congo, as soon as the armed con-
flict had started by the German invasion of Bel-
gium (August 1914). The operation of practical 
legal reasoning in diplomacy on the one hand, 
and the opinions of domestic lawyers in the Jour-
nal des Tribunaux on the other hand, are essential 
complements to the patriotic ‘classics’ of the Belle 
Époque24, the renowned international lawyers 
Ernest Nys (1851-1920)25 and Edouard Descamps 
(1847-1933)26.
In the ensuing paragraphs, we will first develop the 
treatment of the concept of neutrality within the 
community of Belgian international law experts 
and in the Journal des Tribunaux (II), to pass on 
to the concept’s legal articulation (III), split out in 
subsections on Belgian and Congolese neutrality, 
both in international and national literature.
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II. The concept of neutrality in 
communities of lawyers and legal experts
Who were the fathers of 
Belgian neutrality ?
The neutrality of Belgium was imposed by the 
conferences of London, held during the first 
months of the Belgian revolution27. The decision 
to isolate the former Southern Netherlands from 
high politics, and to use it as a buffer, had a long 
prehistory28. The United Kingdom of the Nether-
lands, created in 1814-1815, had originally been 
designed as a buffer against France. The Belgian 
Revolution (September-October 1830) perturbed 
the conservative international system29. The only 
way for the young state to gain acceptance was 
the imposition of a status of permanent neutrality.
The Treaty of London (19 April 1839)30 concluded 
between Belgium and the Great Powers (France, 
Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia) determined the 
final phrasing. Article VII imposed on Belgium the 
obligation to remain perpetually neutral, and to 
27. Protocol of 20 December 1830. See : eMile Banning, Les origines et les phases de la neutralité belge (ed. Alfred De Ridder), 
Bruxelles, 1927, p. 40.
28. rené dollot, Les origines de la neutralité de la Belgique et le système de la Barrière (1609-1830), Paris, 1902.
29. Talleyrand to Sebastiani, London, 5 November 1830, published in : cHarleS-Maurice de talleyrand-Périgord, Mémoires 
ou Opinion sur les affaires de mon temps (vol. 6) (ed. Bruno Ciotti), Clermont-Ferrand, 2007, p. 793. See also : tHierry lentz, 
Le congrès de Vienne : une refondation de l’Europe 1814-1815 (Collection Tempus, 602), Paris, 2015 ; Mark jarrett, 
The Congress of Vienna and its Legacy : War and Great Power Diplomacy after Napoleon, London, 2014 ; MattHiaS ScHulz, 
Normen und Praxis : das europäische Konzert der Grossmächte als Sicherheitsrat, 1815-1860 (Studien zur internationalen 
Geschichte, 21), München, 2009.
30. Treaty of London between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and the Netherlands, 19 April 1839, in 88 CTS, 
p. 411- ; Treaty of London between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Belgium, 19 April 1839, in 88 CTS, p. 421.
31. “La Belgique dans les limites indiquées aux articles I, II et IV formera un État indépendant et perpétuellement neutre. 
Elle sera tenue d’observer cette même neutralité envers tous les autres États.” See : Art. VII, Treaty of London between Austria, 
France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and the Netherlands, 19 April 1839, 88 CTS 411 and NA (National Archives), 
FO (Foreign Office), 94-. See also : Fleury de lannoy, Histoire diplomatique de l’indépendance Belge, Bruxelles, 1930.
32. doMinique gaurier, Histoire du droit international, Rennes, 2014, p. 853. See also : carloS calvo, Le droit international 
théorique et pratique, Paris, 1870, p. 386.
33. jan anckaer, “Dangerous Opportunities ? Reassessing Belgian Neutrality during the Crimean War (1853-1856)”, in 
Journal of Belgian History, 2014, n° 4, p. 68-111 ; MicHael auwerS, “Expansion vs. Neutrality : How Belgian Diplomats Dealt 
with the ‘Military Question’, 1895-1914”, in Journal of Belgian History, 2016, n° 2, p. 100-127 ; alFred de ridder, “La crise 
de la neutralité belge de 1887”, in Revue catholique des idées et des faits, 1927, n° ? ? ?, p. 14-18 ; daniel H. tHoMaS, 
The Guarantee of Belgian Independence and Neutrality in European Diplomacy : 1830ss-1930s, Kingston, 1983.
34. eugen gottScHalk, Frankreich und das neutralisierte Belgien, Stuttgart, 1926 ; cHarleS woeSte, La neutralité belge : 
la Belgique et la France, Bruxelles and Paris 1891. Already in 1839, Soult (1769-1851), President of the French King’s Council 
of Ministers, proposed a throttling customs union to Belgium : the Court of Cassation in Paris and the French customs 
administration would simply take over the competences of their Belgian counterparts.
35. HorSt ladeMacHer, Die belgische Neutralität als Problem der europäischen Politik 1830-1914, Bonn, 1971, p. 115-116 ; 
Banning, Les origines et les phases, p. 69-79.
observe this attitude towards all other nations31. 
The Great Powers’ guarantee was made condi-
tional on this attitude32.
Guillaume (Wilhelm) Arendt, sherpa for 
Leopold I
Although the treaty’s articles would govern the 
country’s international status until the First World 
War, a lot was left to interpretation. The treaty did 
not clearly determine the list or extent of obliga-
tions Belgium would be under. Within the diplo-
matic context of the first decades of its sovereign 
existence, Belgium’s position was constantly 
under threat33. The danger came mainly from 
France, which was feared under the July Mon-
archy, the Second Empire as well as under the 
‘leftist’ Third Republic34. In one of these episodes, 
in 1840, the Orient Crisis threatened to trigger an 
all-out general war35. Adolphe Thiers (1797-1877), 
President of the French King’s Council of Ministers, 
menaced to invade Belgium and the Rhineland. 
Although the danger disappeared with Thiers’s 
dismissal, Leopold I (1790-1865), the King of the 
Belgians, did request the drafting of a thorough 
Wilhelm Arendt, Essai sur la neutralité de la Belgique, considérée principalement sous le point de vue 
du droit public, Brussels/Leipzig 1845.
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legal work that could serve as an official manifesto 
against invasion36. As a result, the German-born 
Wilhelm Arendt (1808-1865), professor of politi-
cal history, oriental literature and classical antiq-
uity at the University of Louvain, produced a copi-
ous Essai sur la neutralité de la Belgique (1845)37. 
Arendt had had studied Lutheran theology in Ber-
lin, and was thus no trained lawyer. Yet, the state 
of public international law in the 19th century 
allowed a well-versed intellectual with a rigorous 
philological method to draw up a nuanced image 
of ‘permanent’ neutrality.
Arendt used the available customary law, general 
principles of the law of nations, and doctrine38 to 
conclude that no similar situation had ever been 
created39. The sovereignty of the country itself was 
dependent on the permanent observance of obli-
gations that were normally only temporarily appli-
cable, on a voluntary basis40. Concluding offensive 
alliances, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of 
another state41, or, less obvious, contracting obli-
gations with third parties that implicitly brought 
the Belgian state to favour a belligerent, would 
result in the end of the Great Powers’ guarantee, 
and would terminate ipso facto the Treaty of Lon-
don42. Arendt advised the government to stretch 
the commercial possibilities of neutrality to the 
36. ladeMacHer, Die belgische Neutralität, p. 222. See also : gita deneckere, Leopold I : de ‘eerste koning van Europa’, Antwerpen, 
2011, p. 319-321 ; Mario HoSte, Leopold I, Sylvain Van de Weyer en het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken : een bijdrage tot de 
politieke en diplomatieke geschiedenis van België (1831-1845), unpulished MA thesis, Ghent University, 1991, p. 190-207.
37. guillauMe (wilHelM) arendt, Essai sur la neutralité de la Belgique, Bruxelles and Leipzig, 1845 ; joSePH ruwet, “Arendt 
(Guillaume-Amédée-Auguste)”, in Biographie Nationale de Belgique (volume 30, suppl. II, fasc. I), Bruxelles, 1958, 
col. 40-48 ; HerMann von der dunk, Der deutsche Vormärz und Belgien 1830-48, Wiesbaden, 1966, p. 166-167 and 179-180. 
Arendt was recruited by De Ram, the first rector of the newly established Catholic University of Louvain, which replaced 
the State University created by William I in 1817.
38. joHann ludwig klüBer, Droit des gens moderne de l’Europe, Stuttgart, 1819 ; georg FriedricH von MartenS, Précis du droit 
des gens moderne de l’Europe, Göttingen, 1821 ; eMer de vattel, Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à 
la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains, Paris, 1835-1835 (first edition 1758).
39. The examples of Genoa (which failed to defend itself against France) of the Helvetian Confederation (which failed to 
oppose the transit of both French imperial and allied coalition troops) could not be equalled to the sui generis Belgian case. 
See : arendt, Essai sur la neutralité…, p. 107.
40. arendt, Essai sur la neutralité, p. 89. On the concept of neutrality, see also : MicHael BotHe, “Neutrality, Concept and 
General Rules”, in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Oxford, 2015 (http://opil.ouplaw.com ; last accessed 
12 June 2017).
41. arendt, Essai sur la neutralité, p. 93.
42. Idem, p. 91.
43. Idem, p. 211.
44. williaM edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law, Oxford, 1884, p. 601-606.
45. StePHen c. neFF, Justice Among Nations, Cambridge (Mass.), 2014, p. 71.
utmost, drawing profit from Belgium’s geograph-
ical position as intermediary between the Great 
Powers. The conclusion of numerous treaties of 
trade and navigation was imperative43.
Furthermore, the main difficulty of the interna-
tional status resided in the epitheton ‘permanent’. 
In essence, neutrality could never be permanent, 
since it always depended on the existence of an 
armed conflict between two states. In the early 
modern period, voluntary neutrality equalled the 
deliberate choice of a non-belligerent – ‘non hos-
tis’ (Bynkershoek) or ‘medius in bello’ (Grotius) –44 
to remain aloof from a quarrel fought over a cause 
he could not judge. This implied the right to engage 
in trade, save for items of contraband (arms, goods 
capable to serve during a war) and an obligation to 
act impartially. Such an attitude would have been 
incompatible in the medieval, theological law of 
nations, built on ideas of justice. If one belligerent 
acted with a just cause (‘causa iusta’), assistance to 
the opponent was not tolerable. The disintegration 
of European moral unity, by contrast, made neutral-
ity acceptable45.
‘Permanent’ neutrality should have perpetuated 
this exceptional situation. Yet, neutrality in no 
ways precluded a state from taking up arms to 
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exercise its legitimate right of self-defence, inti-
mately tied to every state’s fundamental right to 
self-preservation46/ Permanent neutrality ought to 
be credible47. In the contrary case, Belgium would 
soon be a prey for invaders. The guarantee of the 
Great Powers, finally, was dependent on their 
willingness to execute the guarantee obligations 
enshrined in the Treaty of London. Would an inva-
sion automatically trigger their responsibility ? 
Or would the Belgian government need to notice 
every guarantor individually ?
Arendt’s questions on the fragility of the guaran-
tee were answered in the 1870 treaties concluded 
between Britain and France as well as between 
Britain and Prussia. In contrast with 1840, France 
and Prussia came to hands48. After the French dec-
laration of war (19 July 1870), Gladstone’s (1809-
1898) liberal government obtained the pledge from 
Prussia (9 August 1870) and France (11 August 
1870) that they would respect their word given 
in 1839. Yet, this agreement, concluded without 
Belgian participation, raised more questions than 
it answered or than the Catholic chief of govern-
ment Jules d’Anethan (1803-1888) would admit 
of49. Why would it be necessary, in view of the 
pacta sunt servanda principle, to reiterate one’s 
respect for treaty obligations ? If treaties were 
binding, how could the ensuing obligations come 
to disappear over time ? How could a reaffirma-
46. joHn weStlake, Études sur les principes du droit international, Bruxelles and Paris 1895, p. 120-126.
47. arendt, Essai sur la neutralité, p. 67. Arendt noted that the centralised system of government enacted by the 1831 
constitution was in this regard superior to the ‘vices of the federal system’, as encountered in Switzerland or the United States 
of America.
48. geoFFrey wawro, The Franco-Prussian War : the German Conquest of France in 1870-1871, Cambridge, 2003.
49. ladeMacHer, Die belgische Neutralität…, p. 245.
50. National Archives (Kew), Foreign Office, 834/9, Confidential blue print : R.P. Collier, J.D. Coleridge and Travers Twiss Q.C. 
to Earl Grenville (1815-1891, Minister for Foreign Affairs), London (Inner Temple), 6 August 1870, p. 8.
51. jan vanderSMiSSen, Koningen van de wereld : Leopold II en de aardrijkskundige beweging, Leuven, 2009.
52. jean StengerS, Belgique et Congo : élaboration de la Charte Coloniale, Bruxelles, 1963, p. 13. Paul Hymans in the Chamber 
of Representatives, 1 March 1906 (Parliamentary Proceedings, Chamber of Representatives, Session 1 March 1906, p. 15. 
(plenum.be : https://sites.google.com/site/bplenum/proceedings/1906/k00233248/k00233248_00) : “Les législations étrangères 
offrent des types nombreux de régimes coloniaux qui, tout en laissant aux gouvernements locaux une large part d’autonomie 
et d’autorité, font place cependant à l’intervention de collèges consultatifs et au contrôle supérieur du parlement.[…] 
Mais, messieurs, l’absolutisme, fût-ce en Afrique, fût-il exercé par un esprit génial, n’est pas un régime durable. Le provisoire 
ne peut pas toujours durer.’
53. deScaMPS, La neutralité…, p. 473.
54. genin, Un “laboratoire belge”…, p. 140-145, 148, 150-151 and 225-226.
55. juleS garSou, Frère-Orban de 1857 à 1896, Bruxelles, 1946.
tion have any legal sense ? Could an obligation 
to guarantee Belgian sovereignty extinguish in 
the course of time, or, more specifically, when 
Belgium acquired new territory50 ?
Ernest Nys, to the rescue of Leopold II
The most popular narratives of Belgian neutrality 
were written in the Belle Époque by Nys and Des-
camps. Pursuant to the colonial appetite expressed 
by his late father Leopold I (who thought of acquir-
ing parts of Portuguese Africa or Latin-America), 
King Leopold II (1835-1909) realized his auto-
cratic dream by creating the Congo Free State51. 
No constitutional limitations such as contraseign 
or parliamentary sovereignty would burden the 
exercise of monarchical power in Africa52. As is 
well known, Leopold obtained comfortable parlia-
mentary assent to create a personal union between 
his Belgian and African territories53. The reciprocal 
relationship between the King and Belgian interna-
tional lawyers led to the creation of chairs of inter-
national law, and to the personal advancement of 
the royal sycophant’s careers54.
To what extent could the personal acquisition of 
territory overseas by the monarch constitute a vio-
lation of Belgian’s obligation to remain aloof from 
the vicissitudes of international politics ? In the 
1860s, the liberal government of Frère-Orban55 
and Rogier tried to delimit the validity of Belgian 
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neutrality to the perimeter of civilised European 
nations. Belgian commercial involvement in the 
American Civil War (1861-1865) or in the attempt 
to install Maximilian of Austria as Emperor of 
Mexico (1865) were justified on this basis56.
Yet, at the conclusion of 1870 guarantee treaties, 
Gladstone’s government made it perfectly clear 
that the 1839 guarantee could only concern the 
European borders of Belgium. The colonial appe-
tite of the Saxe-Coburghs was known in London 
for decades57. Britain, whose colonial possessions 
and dominions stretched the entire globe, had a 
paramount interest in keeping oversight over the 
distribution of territory. Even if the Congo was sit-
uated in Africa, Britain was still to be considered 
a civilised nation.
Edouard Descamps and Ernest Nys, who were both 
closely involved in Belgian colonial expansion, 
felt the need to tie the national narrative to the 
great endeavour of Leopold II’s reign. This implied 
a first conceptual step : qualifying the Provisional 
Government’s Declaration of Independence 
on 4 October 1830 as a decisive constitutional 
moment. If Belgian sovereignty had depended on 
international recognition, the mandatory and con-
genital character of neutrality would have repre-
sented too much of a burden for the acquisition of 
the Congo Free State58. Nys argued that, through 
the Italian and German unifications, or even at 
the American Revolt (1776-1787) against Britain, 
56. FranciS Balace (ed.), La guerre de sécession et la Belgique : documents d’archives américaines 1861-1865, Louvain, 1969, 
p. xxi-xxvii ; Banning, Les origines et les phases…, p. 119-124 and 147-174.
57. deneckere, Leopold I…, p. 608.
58. erneSt nyS, L’état indépendant du Congo et le droit international, Bruxelles, 1903, p. 67.
59. Idem, p. 66.
60. Paul laBand, Le droit public de l’empire allemand (vol. 1) (transl. Camille Gandilhon), Paris, 1901, p. 116.
61. The same point of view on the Berlin Act (“une légende”) can be found in : roBert Senelle and éMile cléMent, Léopold II et 
la Charte coloniale (1885-1908), Bruxelles, 2009, p. 11.
62. nyS, État indépendant du Congo…, p. 62. See also : genin, Un “laboratoire belge” du droit, p. 146-148 ; Nys’s contributions 
in Revue de droit international et de legislation comparée 1903, containing the same arguments. On Nys’s publication practices, 
see : dHondt, “L’histoire, parole vivante”…, p. 113-114.
63. StePHen c. neFF, “Through a Glass, Darkly : Reflections on James Lorimer’s International Law”, in European Journal of 
International Law, 2016, n° 2, p. 409-413.
 sovereignty had been established on the basis of 
the “nationality principle”59.
The intervention of Great Powers could only 
 recognize ex post, in a declaratory manner, what 
had already existed before. A state was primarily 
a society of men, established on a given terri-
tory, controlled by an autonomous government. 
Leaning heavily on the writings of Paul Laband60, 
Nys argued that the ius dominandi or capacity to 
dominate a territory and population determined 
statehood. International recognition was merely a 
contingent and political affair61. Nys used the Ger-
man Confederation, created as a confederation of 
states by the Vienna Final Act (1815-1820) as a 
counterexample. External recognition alone could 
never be constitutive, only declaratory62.
This line of argumentation made it possible to 
downplay the legal effect of the Act of Berlin 
(26 February 1885). For Nys, the Congo Free State 
– like Belgium in 1830 – had already developed 
international relations prior to the conference, 
and could thus not be called into question again. 
Establishing sovereignty over the newly acquired 
territories could be rooted in the distinction 
between civilised, barbarian and savage entities63.
Edouard Descamps, the apostle of peace ?
Descamps, from his side, tried to immunize Bel-
gium from foreign (e.g. British) intervention by 
conceiving neutrality as the imposition of a cod-
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ified standard of law.64 Belgian neutrality would 
have served as the example for the neutralization 
of Luxemburg (1867)65 and, of course, the Congo 
basin66. The institution of perpetual neutrality 
can be seen as a forerunner of ‘peace organized 
by law’.67 In four documented and learned parts, 
Descamps argued that the regime of neutrality had 
been absorbed by the conception of ‘le pacigérat 
positif’, based on the principle of common and 
equal sovereignty68. Descamps’s ideas represented 
the upswing mood of pacifist international lawyers 
as James Lorimer (1818-1890) or politicians as de 
Parieu (1815-1893) who pleaded for establishing a 
yearly or permanent congress of all nations in either 
permanently neutral Switzerland or Belgium69.
In this peaceful and international law-constructed 
world, the ‘old’ conception of neutrality, based 
on “la compression et l’effacement des États 
pacifiques” would have disappeared. Belgian 
 sovereignty preceded international recognition ; 
neutrality could not exclude an autonomous for-
eign policy70. Descamps translated confidence and 
patriotism. Belgian domestic lawyers, whose social 
64. jean StengerS, “Léopold II et la rivalité franco-anglaise en Afrique, 1882-1884”, in Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire/
Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis, 1969, n° 2, pp. 425-479 ; genin, Un “laboratoire belge”…, p. 138 and 151-152. 
See also : edouard deScaMPS, “Le différend anglo-congolais”, in Revue de droit international et de législation comparée, 1904, 
p. 233-259 : “les efforts colonisateurs des autres États sont peu appréciés en Angleterre, et les aptitudes colonisatrices y sont 
même généralement regardées comme l’apanage de quelques rares - très rares - peuples privilégiés” (p. 235).
65. See : roBert deMoulin, “Léopold II et le grand-duché de Luxemburg au printemps de 1867”, in Mélanges offerts à 
G. Jacquemyns, Bruxelles 1968, p. 163-189 ; Maria de waele, Naar een groter België ? De Belgische territoriale eisen tijdens 
en na de Eerste Wereldoorlog : een onderzoek naar de hoofddoeleinden, de besluitvorming, de realisatiemiddelen en 
de propagandavoering van de buitenlandse politiek (vol. 1), unpublished doctoral thesis, Ghent University, 1989, p. 36-80.
66. This view was shared by Albert de La Pradelle. See : alBert de la Pradelle, “The Neutrality of Belgium”, in The North 
American Review, 1914, n° 709, p. 847.
67. deScaMPS, La neutralité, p. 618.
68. Idem, p. 597.
69. joHann caSPar BluntScHli, Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staaten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt, Nordlingen, 
1872 (first edition 1868), p. 110. For the controversy between Lorimer and Bluntschli, see : Bruno arcidiacono, “La paix par 
le droit international, dans la vision de deux juristes du XIXe siècle : le débat Lorimer-Bluntschli”, Relations internationales, 
2012, n° 149, p. 13-26. Descamps’s point of view was shared at the Interparliamentary Union for Peace in 1900 and 
1902. See : gaurier, Histoire du droit international, p. 849). See also : cecelia lyncH, “Peace movements, civil society, 
and the development of international law”, in Bardo FaSSBender and anne PeterS (eds.), Oxford Handbook of the History of 
International Law, Oxford 2012, p. 194-204.
70. deScaMPS, La neutralité…, p. 202.
71. Pierre graux, “La neutralité de la Belgique et l’annexion du Congo”, in JT 1904, col. 1211-1221 ; Pierre graux, “La neutralité 
de la Belgique et l’annexion du Congo”, in Revue de droit international et de legislation comparée, 1905, p. 33-52.
72. Charles Graux was born in a liberal family and studied law at the Free University of Brussels. In 1862 he became a 
member of the Brussels Bar. He defended a progressive line in the liberal party. In 1878 Graux was elected as senator 
and he became eventually Minister of Finance. From 1875 onward, he taught penal law at the Free University of Brussels. 
See : nadine luBelSki-Bernard, “Graux, Charles”, in Nouvelle Biographie Nationale (vol. 1), Bruxelles, Académie Royale des 
Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgique, 1988, col. 112-118.
world is at the heart of the ensuing section, would 
follow this élan.
Descamps and Nys inspiring young lawyers 
in Brussels
The importance of Nys and Descamps for younger 
generations of Belgian lawyers cannot be denied. 
Two examples can be retraced in the Journal des 
Tribunaux, which had taken a firm position against 
the Red Rubber Campaign. It published two arti-
cles, in fact lectures held before the Brussels Young 
Bar Association, which discussed the impact of 
the take-over of the CFS by Belgium.
In his opening speech for the new judicial year 
1904-1905, published in the Journal des Tribunaux 
and Revue de droit international et de législation 
comparée71, attorney-at-law (avocat/advocaat) 
Pierre Graux, son of the liberal politician, attor-
ney-at-law and professor Charles Graux (1837-
1910)72, discussed for the first time the possible 
consequences of the CFS take-over by Belgium. 
The lecture did not find its origins in the British 
CFS propaganda war, but in the contestation of Bel-
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gium’s neutrality. Since the 1890s, foreign scholars 
had argued that Belgium jeopardized both its neu-
trality and existence when it continued to pursue its 
colonial aspirations. Already in 1894, the Bordeaux 
professor Frantz Despagnet (1857-1906)73 had writ-
ten : “The Belgians want the Congo. But France 
does not have to agree on this annexation, because 
it compromises Belgium’s neutrality”. A year later, 
Paul Fauchille (1858-1926)74, a seminal figure of 
French international law doctrine and a specialist 
of neutrality law, declared the annexation of Congo 
to Belgium not compatible with the country’s per-
petual neutrality75.
The French reluctance was rooted in a fear that 
Belgium had begun to colonize the CFS against all 
international agreements. To claim the Congolese 
territories, King Leopold II lobbied and received 
international support from all Western powers. The 
Belgian King needed to dismantle the threat of a 
potential invasion, specifically a French one, since 
France had colonized the territory of Congo-Braz-
zaville. A solution presented itself in a convention 
signed in 1884 between the Association Interna-
tionale Africaine – the official predecessor of the 
CFS – and France. France recognized the Congo-
lese sovereignty rights, but in case the sovereignty 
should lapse, it could claim the CFS territory. 
In other words, if King Leopold and the CFS were 
not able to fulfil their international engagements 
such as freedom of trade in the Congo Basin and 
73. Bernadette Suau (ed.), Mémoire des Landes : dictionnaire biographique, Mont-de-Marsan, Comité d’études sur l’histoire et 
l’art de la Gascogne, 1991, p. 108.
74. claudine Moutardier, “Paul Fauchille”, Société française pour le droit international (accessed online on October 25, 2016 ; 
http://www.sfdi.org/internationalistes/fauchille/) ; Henry BonFilS and Paul FaucHille, Manuel de droit international public, Paris, 
1909, (first edition 1894).
75. Fauchille was even doubtful if the personal union in itself respected the spirit of the Treaty of London. See : Paul FaucHille, 
“Les frontières de l’État du Congo”, in Revue générale de droit international public, 1894, p. 422 (“La situation est plus délicate 
encore en ce qui concerne l’union personnelle de la Belgique et du Congo : car cet Etat n’a d’autres sujets que des noirs ; 
ces fonctionnaires, ses officiers sont […] des Belges ; si l’Etat était engagé dans une guerre […] serait-ce de la part de ce Royaume 
garder une neutralité stricte que de laisser de nombreux sujets belges commander des troupes congolaises ? La situation actuelle 
ne présente-t-elle pas, dans une large mesure, les inconvénients qu’aurait une annexion de l’État du Congo par la Belgique […] 
qui comporterait […] des obligations militaires incompatibles avec cette neutralité ?”).
76. Major Albert Thys had to answer to Belgian investors what happened with the money invested in the Matadi-Stanley Pool 
(today Pool Malebo) railway. As the Congo river between Matadi and Kinshasa was not navigable, a railroad could bring relief. 
Major Albert Thys took the lead of the building project which was twice as expensive as initially anticipated. See : alBert tHyS, 
L’annexion du Congo, Bruxelles, 1895, p. 6-10.
77. eugène Soudan, La reprise du Congo et le droit international, Bruxelles, 1908, p. 5.
78. Pierre graux, “La neutralité”…, p. 35.
perpetual neutrality, France could take over the 
territory. According to the French, the neutrality 
promise had lapsed in 1890, when Belgium lent 25 
million francs to the CFS. The metropole, in turn, 
received a right to annex the overseas territories 
when the loan would not be repaid after ten years. 
Especially when it became clear in 1895 that more 
Belgian money was needed to develop the colo-
nial infrastructure, the parliament drafted a first 
proposal to annex the CFS. Since a lot of money 
had already been lost, public opinion and political 
parties proved very hostile76. The cession project 
was almost immediately subordinated77. Parliament 
only allowed an extra loan of 6,850,000 francs 
under the conditions of the 1890 act. In 1901, 
the Belgian government thus had the free choice 
whether it would engage in an annexation project.
According to foreign scholars, an annexation pro-
ject acted directly against Belgium’s and the CFS’s 
perpetual neutrality. Neutrality not only meant 
keeping aloof from international conflicts, it also 
included an active duty to avoid possible con-
flicts. A colonial empire jeopardized this neutral-
ity, since the odds for conflict in Africa increased. 
It could force the recognizing powers to annul 
the London Treaty and make Belgium disap-
pear. Graux remarked that other colonial powers 
intentionally tried to confine Belgium in its colo-
nial adventure by “imposing a new international 
law”78. Graux referred to Ernest Nys and stated that 
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a declaration of independence and  sovereignty 
is a fact and other nation states can do nothing 
more but acknowledge the existence of the new 
state. The only thing other nations could do to 
recognize a new country, was to impose certain 
conditions. Hence, Belgium’s perpetual neutrality 
was a mere condition for the country’s recognition 
in the “‘concert of nations’. Belgium had the right 
to develop and expand overseas, just like other 
European powers. It is remarkable that Graux only 
discussed Belgium’s neutrality duties and did not 
consider the Congolese point of view. Both neu-
tralities were juxtaposed only four years later by 
the young and promising attorney-at-law Eugène 
Soudan (1880-1960)79.
In 1908, when the take-over of the CFS was immi-
nent, the Journal des Tribunaux and the Comité 
de propagande coloniale (Committee of Colo-
nial Propaganda) published a report presented 
by Eugène Soudan before the Section de droit 
colonial (Section of Colonial Law), a subdivision 
of the Brussels Young Bar Association (see infra)80. 
Soudan largely used the arguments brought for-
ward by Graux. On Belgium’s neutrality he con-
cluded : “Belgium is a sovereign state, existing 
by its own will and not by grace of the Powers. 
Those could only recognize the country and to 
that end impose its neutrality”. Moreover, the neu-
trality clause of the London Treaty could only be 
imposed on the borders of continental Belgium, 
since no one in 1839 could have foreseen that 
the new state would become a colonial power. 
Since the treaty had internationally recognized 
Belgium as a sovereign state, it had the same rights 
as any other state, including the right to colonize.
79. Soudan studied law at Ghent University and became an attorney at the Brussels Bar. After the First World War, 
he was appointed professor at the Free University of Brussels, where he would become dean of the law faculty, a position 
he combined with a career in parliament and local politics for the Belgian Workers Party. See : Marc-antoine PierSon, 
“Soudan, Eugène”, Biographie Nationale (vol. 37), Bruxelles, 1971, col. 740-744.
80. eugène Soudan, “La reprise du Congo et le droit international”, in JT 1908, col. 585-596, 641-652, 657-668, 673-684, 
689-698 and 705-714 ; Eugène Soudan, La reprise du Congo et le droit international, Bruxelles, 1908.
81. vandenBogaerde, Vectoren van het recht…, p. 110-112.
On the CFS’s sovereignty, Soudan interpreted in 
analogy with Nys that the Berlin Act had recog-
nized the CFS as a full-fledged state. The Congo 
Free State was already a state before 1885, since 
the Leopoldian project had started in the 1870s 
and King Leopold II had claimed the territory 
before the Berlin Conference. As an example, 
the attorney referred to the United States which 
was internationally recognized in the 1780s, 
although no one contested that it had been inde-
pendent and sovereign since 1776, an argument 
taken over literally from Nys. Soudan drew par-
allels with the establishment of the CFS. To tackle 
the criticism that Belgium occupied the Congo ter-
ritories, Soudan stated that the indigenous people 
voluntary subjected themselves to the CFS by sign-
ing treaties. Hence, the rights of the indigenous 
had never been violated. Moreover, he stated that 
all humans, irrespectively the colour of their skin, 
had the same rights. Indeed, power could lead to 
abuses, but according to Soudan, the local people 
had made serious progress, both on a material and 
a moral level. In other words, the colonial project 
of King Leopold II had brought nothing but pros-
perity. In many ways, Soudan’s exposé was repre-
sentative for the opinion propagated by a (fairly) 
large part of the Brussels attorneys. At that time, 
they found a forum in one of Belgium’s leading 
legal periodicals : the Journal des Tribunaux.
The Journal des Tribunaux and the colonies
Between 1881 and 1914, the Journal des Tribunaux 
gained a leading position amongst Belgium’s legal 
periodical press.81 Driving forces were founder 
Edmond Picard, who was in charge from 1881 
until 1900, and his assistant Léon Hennebicq 
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(1871-1940)82, who took over the journal until 
1940. Both eras coincide with a change in the 
debate about the CFS. At first, Belgian lawyers 
seemed to move in overlapping worlds with indus-
trialists, politicians and military leaders. One of 
the leading figures in this debate was Edmond 
Picard, who used his Journal des Tribunaux as a 
forum for those networks. After the turn of the cen-
tury, Léon Hennebicq changed the course of the 
legal periodical and engaged in a crusade against 
the Red Rubber campaign.
Picard’s Journal des Tribunaux : legally 
securing the Congo Free State (1885-1900)
During the Belle Époque, national feelings in Bel-
gium soared, not the least because of King Leo-
pold II. To celebrate fifty years of independence, 
he commissioned the Parc du Cinquantenaire, 
which also symbolised the economic and indus-
trial performance of Belgium. Almost simultane-
ously, the Brussels Palace of Justice was inaugu-
rated (1883). Its grandeur – it was at that time the 
largest building in the world – filled the public with 
awe and it became the centre of Belgium’s legal 
world. In its court rooms, leading attorneys-at-law 
pleaded their cases before prominent  magistrates. 
The central figure seemed to be Edmond Picard, 
who believed that a good lawyer should not only 
take interest in legal issues, but should also be 
open-minded towards social, cultural and politi-
cal issues. He personified these values since he 
was both attorney-at-law before the Supreme 
Court (Cour de Cassation/Hof van Cassatie) and 
senator for the Belgian Socialist Party (POB, Parti 
Ouvrier Belge/Belgische Werkliedenpartij, BWP). 
82. Léon Hennebicq studied law at the Free University of Brussels and became an intern at the office of Edmond Picard. 
He was elected president of the Conférence du Jeune Barreau, member of the Bar Council, secretary and later president of 
Fédération des avocats belges and in 1925 he became batonnier at the Brussels Bar Association. He was also responsible 
for the publication of La Vérité sur le Congo, a periodical published between 1903 and 1907. See : georgeS aronStein, 
“Hennebicq, Léon”, Biographie nationale (vol. 30), Bruxelles, 1958, p. 451-458 ; de waele, Naar een groter België…, p. 95-97.
83. Initially, the Journal des Tribunaux was a weekly, but due to its immediate success the editors decided to publish it twice 
a week, which enabled it to follow the events in Belgium’s legal world closely.
84. Bart coPPein, “Bringing Law to the People.
85. Edmond Picard is generally seen as the inventor of the Âme belge concept, which was later endorsed by the leading 
historians Henri Pirenne and Godefroid Kurth. See : SaraH keyMeulen, Het fenomeen Pirenne : de geschiedenis van 
een reputatie, unpublished doctoral thesis, Ghent University, 2017.
86. En Congolie has been reprinted several times. For this article we have used the third print, published in 1909 and updated 
with Notre Congo. See : edMond Picard, En Congolie 1896 suivi de Notre Congo en 1909, Bruxelles, 1909.
Moreover, he patronized artists and moved in 
artistic circles. For his (semi-)weekly Journal des 
Tribunaux83, he assembled a like-minded team 
as editorial board whose members showed large 
interests in law, the arts and politics which was 
illustrated in the journal itself.
The Journal des Tribunaux embodied Picard’s 
philosophy to ‘bring law to the people’. The edi-
tor-in-chief adhered to the ideas that law is a cul-
tural phenomenon, and that the public has to be 
acquainted with all aspects of the national legal 
system. In its form, the JT was conceived as a ‘jour-
nal’, a daily newspaper, meant to be bought and 
read by all citizens. Spreading legal knowledge 
was expected to strengthen Belgium as a nation84.
Edmond Picard promoted the Belgian nation and 
shared his enthusiasm through his publications, of 
which L’Âme belge (The Belgian Spirit), published 
in an edition of the Revue Encyclopédique in 1897, 
is the most renowned85. L’Âme belge was written 
in the aftermath of Picard’s voyage to the Congo 
Free State between August and October 1896. 
As the ‘first tourist ever’, he wanted to assess the 
situation in the country himself. He embarked on 
the steamer Léopoldville to visit the royal domain in 
Africa, and not long after his return, he published 
his diary En Congolie86. Picard’s voyage in Africa 
fulfilled him with the idea that Belgian presence in 
the Congo Free State was much needed and just. In 
his opinion, the Congo Free State was exemplary to 
other colonial empires, while it proved the primor-
dial role of the Belgians in the ‘concert of nations’. 
Belgium deserved its place between its much larger 
Edmond Picard in Congo, photograph published in the Journal des Tribunaux 1925 
col. 174-175 (photographer unknown).
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neighbouring countries Germany, England and 
France. Even though Picard was not too fond about 
the monarchy, headmired King Leopold’s colonial 
adventure. The bond between Picard and the Royal 
Palace intensified on the Congo debate. Edmond 
van Eetvelde (1852-1925)87, Secretary of State at 
the Domestic Affairs Department of the Congo 
Free State, gave Picard and his intern, the young 
and promising Félicien Cattier (1869-1946)88, ten 
questions to advise King Leopold II on the rights 
of the Private Domain. The work of the attorneys 
was published in 189289. They stipulated that sov-
ereignty of a State not automatically led to the 
property of unoccupied territories (terres vacantes). 
However, they continued, each State had the right 
to regulate property rights. Remarkably, the Journal 
des Tribunaux reported on this questionnaire only 
ten years later when the annexation of the Congo 
Free State became imminent90.
87. jean StengerS, “Eetvelde, van Edmond”, in Biographie Coloniale belge (vol. 2), Bruxelles, Institut Royal Colonial belge/
Koninklijk Belgisch Koloniaal Instituut, 1951, p. 327-335.
88. Cattier studied law at the Free University of Brussels and became attorney-at-law at the Brussels bar. His supervisor 
was Edmond Picard. Together, they published a report on the terres vacantes in the Congo. With Louis Wodon (1868-1946), 
he inquired on indigenous customary law (1894). In 1896, Cattier went to Siam to work for the King who tried to reform 
the country’s administration and judiciary. During this mission, Cattier profiled himself more on moral and humanitarian 
issues in the ‘civilising colonisation’. A year, later he became professor Congolese law. Soon afterwards, he published Droit et 
administration de l’État Indépendant du Congo. See : Pierre kaucH, “Cattier, Félicien”, Biographie nationale (vol. 32), Bruxelles, 
1964, col. 90-94.
89. edMond Picard and Félicien cattier, État indépendant du Congo : consultation délibérée par Me Edmond Picard avec 
la collaboration de Me F. Cattier du Barreau de Bruxelles, novembre 1892, Bruxelles, 1892.
90. edMond Picard, “Les concessions congolaises et la conférence de Berlin”, in JT 1903, col. 737-748, col. 753-763, 
col. 769-777, col. 785-792, col. 801-812 and col. 817-828.
91. The article was completed with the sentence : “Les colonies, possessions d’outre-mer ou protectorats que la Belgique peut 
acquérir sont régis par des lois particulières. Les troupes belges destinées à leur défense ne peuvent être recrutées que par 
des engagements volontaires.”
92. Before Pourbaix became public prosecutor in Charleroi he was attorney-at-law in Brussels. As a young legal practitioner, 
he founded Belgium’s first colonial periodical Le Congo belge and organised conferences to answer critics against Leopold’s 
colonial policy. See : Marie-louiSe coMeliau, “Pourbaix, Victor”, in Biographie Coloniale belge (vol. 4), Bruxelles, Institut Royal 
Colonial belge/Koninklijk Belgisch Koloniaal Instituut, 1955, p. 722.
93. Maarten couttenier, Congo tentoongesteld : een geschiedenis van de Belgische antropologie en het museum van Tervuren 
(1882-1925), Leuven, 2005, p. 121-124.
94. “Société d’Études Coloniales”, in JT 1893, col. 347-348 ; “Société d’Études Coloniales”, in JT 1894, col. 79.
95. oScar landrien, “Allocution”, in JT 1895, col. 1078 ; Marie-louiSe coMeliau, “Pourbaix”, p. 722 ; joSePH-Marie jadot, 
“Iseghem, André van”, Biographie coloniale belge (vol. 5), Bruxelles, Institut Royal Colonial belge/Koninklijk Belgisch 
Koloniaal Instituut, 1958, p. 464-468.
96. Auguste Couvreur was a publisher and a politician. He participated at the 1876 Geographic Conference organized 
by King Leopold II. Couvreur negotiated with France concerning the borders between Gabon and the Congo. He died 
unexpectedly in 1894 and was succeeded as president of the Society of Colonial Studies by Auguste Beernaert (1829-1912) 
who had just resigned as government leader. See : MartHe cooSeManS, “Couvreur, Auguste”, Biographie coloniale belge 
(vol. 4), Bruxelles, Institut Royal Colonial belge/Koninklijk Belgisch Koloniaal Instituut, 1955, p. 163.
97. Out of 700 Brussels attorneys-at-law, 129 became member of the Société des Études Coloniales. During its first year, 
this society had 350 members. See : Maarten couttenier, Congo tentoongesteld, p. 122 ; Bart coPPein and jérôMe de Brouwer, 
Histoire du Barreau de Bruxelles/Geschiedenis van de Balie van Brussel, Bruxelles, 2011, p. 232.
Only when in 1893 the first article of Belgium’s 
Constitution was amended with a colonial clause91, 
some interest for the Congo question arose in the 
Journal des Tribunaux. The young Brussels attorney-
at-law Victor Pourbaix (1867-1906)92 urged to estab-
lish the Société étant favorable à la Politique d’Ex-
pansion Coloniale (Society in favour of a Colonial 
Expansion Policy)93, abbreviated as Société d’Études 
Coloniales.94 Pourbaix became the secretary of this 
association95, whereas August Couvreur (1827-
1894), well-known for his advocacy of the Leo-
poldian Congo, became the association’s first pres-
ident96. All members of the Société, most of whom 
were attorneys-at-law, supported King Leopold II 
and his colonial policy97. The Society was divided 
in a scientific, an economic, and a legal section. 
A few weeks later, a section devoted to political and 
moral sciences was added. The sections were not 
strictly divided, and members of one section could 
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participate in reunions of another. Alphonse Rivier 
(1835-1898)98, professor of international law at the 
Free University of Brussels (Université Libre de Brux-
elles) and one of Belgium’s most renowned schol-
ars on international public law, headed the legal 
component99 which wanted to transplant “the best 
principles of our legislation” in the indigenous law. 
Characteristics such as race, psychology, climate 
and civilisation were taken into account100. The 
study group’s goals and programme were published 
in the Bulletin de la Société d’Études Coloniales101. 
Even though the Société d’Études Coloniales had its 
own periodical, the Journal des Tribunaux reported 
on the legal meetings.
It may seem remarkable that Journal des Tribu-
naux did not report on the important works for the 
colony, and neither did it review the books of its 
editor-in-chief. In fact, between 1885 and 1900, 
the periodical devoted little attention to the Congo 
question, as if it were unimportant. In this sense, 
it confirmed the “large disinterest” Belgian politi-
cians had for the CFS. However, Picard intended 
to keep his Journal des Tribunaux a-political and 
therefore he might have avoided the subject102. 
The absence of the debate on the Congo Free State 
might be explained through his political career as 
a socialist senator (1894-1908). In 1895, the POB 
98. Rivier was born in Lausanne and had studied law in Geneva, Berlin and Paris. From 1867 onwards, he was professor 
at the ULB. He became a member of the leading Institut de Droit International. See : rené dekkerS, “Rivier, Alphonse”, 
Biographie Nationale (vol. 35), Bruxelles, 1969, p. 627-630.
99. The legal section had four subdivisions : 1° International Law, 2° Public Law and relations with the metropole, 3° Internal 
Colonial Law, 4° Comparative Colonial Law. See : “Société d’Études Coloniales”, in JT 1893, col. 347-348 ; “Société d’études 
coloniales”, in JT 1894, col. 79.
100. “La législation coloniale”, in JT 1893, 173-174. See also : eMManuelle tourMe-jouannet, “Des origines coloniales du 
droit international : à propos du droit des gens moderne au XVIIIe siècle”, in Pierre-Marie duPuy and vincent cHétail (eds.), 
The Roots of International Law/Les fondements du droit international : Liber Amicorum Peter Haggenmacher (Legal History 
Library, 11/Studies in the History of International Law, 5), Leiden/Boston 2014, p. 649-647 ; andrew FitzMaurice, Sovereignty, 
Property and Empire, 1500-2000 (Ideas in Context, 107), Cambridge, 2014, p. 271-300 ; genin, Un “laboratoire belge”…, 
p. 133-136. For a more profound reflection on the doctrinal consequences of colonisation, see : Mieke van der linden, 
The Acquisition of Africa (1870-1914) : the Nature of Nineteenth-Century International Law (Legal History Library, 
20/Studies in the History of International Law, 8), Leiden/Boston, 2016, p. 34-94.
101. “Société d’études coloniales”, in JT 1893, p. 347-348.
102. Bart coPPein, Dromen van een nieuwe samenleving…, p. 74-81.
103. janet PolaSky, “Vandervelde, Emile”, in Nouvelle Biographie Nationale (vol. 1), Bruxelles, 1988, col. 344-354.
104. “Nous voulons, en un mot, avant de traiter les nègres comme des blancs, que l’on ait cessé de traiter les blancs comme 
des nègres!” in Parliamentary Proceedings, Chamber of Representatives,Belgian Session 27 June 1895, p. 14. 
https://sites.google.com/site/bplenum/proceedings/1895/k00182053/k00182053_04. (Last accessed 2 January 2018).
105. guy vantHeMScHe, “De Belgische socialisten en Congo 1895-1960”, in Brood en Rozen : tijdschrift voor de geschiedenis 
van sociale bewegingen, 1999, nr. 2, p. 31-65.
openly opposed the colonization project of King 
Leopold II and gave priority to the social question. 
In this sense, Emile Vandervelde’s (1866-1938)103 
1895 intervention was symptomatic when he 
stated : “Let us wait to treat negroes as white men 
until in our country white men are no longer 
treated as negroes”104. Edmond Picard illustrated 
the division amongst politicians. Not all politi-
cians, not even in the socialist party, were against 
the cession of the CFS. Some believed the take-
over of the CFS would benefit both the colony 
and the metropole105. Edmond Picard was one of 
those ferocious supporters of the Leopoldian pro-
ject in Africa, but he was also a true socialist party 
member, following the line drafted by the party. 
Therefore, he did not promote the colonization of 
the CFS in his Journal des Tribunaux. Léon Hen-
nebicq, who succeeded Picard as editor-in-chief, 
drew a much harder line.
Journal des Tribunaux at the centre of 
the colonial legal world : Léon Hennebicq 
(1900-1940)
In 1900, Hennebicq took over the position of 
editor-in-chief from Picard. The young attorney-
at-law resembled his predecessor in several ways. 
He believed that Belgium, based on its history, 
industrial power and intellectual influence, 
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deserved a prominent place in the ‘concert of 
nations’. As president of the Ligue Maritime belge 
and the Institut International de Commerce, 
Hennebicq advocated a large penetration of Bel-
gium on the world markets, which could only be 
reached through a colonial empire. Further, he was 
involved in colonial periodicals such as Le Mou-
vement Maritime (1901-1904), which merged in 
1905 with La Belgique Coloniale (1895-1904)106 
into La Belgique Maritime et Coloniale (1905-
1921). He worked also for Le Matin, a paper 
defending Leopold’s policy in Africa, and the Mou-
vement Géographique (1884-1922). All journals 
participated in the polemical discussion concern-
ing Belgian colonialism. The connections between 
these journals are revealed in articles copied and 
published in the Journal des Tribunaux107.
Léon Hennebicq cherished some political ambi-
tions, but in contrast to Edmond Picard, he could 
not submit himself to a political line. This might 
explain the harsher opinions the Journal des Tribu-
naux uttered about the Congolese question. Despite 
his conviction that Belgium had to take over the CFS 
without further ado, Hennebicq remained loyal to 
the programme of his legal periodical. He allowed 
publications of influential collaborators such as 
the later Minister of Colonies Henri Jaspar (1870-
106. La Belgique Coloniale was headed by René Vauthier, who worked closely together with Edmond Picard and 
Léon Hennebicq. Several of his articles on the Congo Free State were published in the Journal des Tribunaux. 
See : katrien rotSaert, La Belgique Coloniale : analyse van een koloniaal tijdschrift toegespitst op de onafhankelijke Kongostaat 
1895-1909, unpublished MA thesis, Ghent University, 2001.
107. E.g. : Paul errera, “La constitution belge et le Congo”, in JT 1901, col. 705-716.
108. Jaspar studied law at the Université Libre de Bruxelles and afterwards enrolled at the Brussels Bar, where he was an 
intern of Victor Bonnevie, who was member of the Journal des Tribunaux’s editorial board. Together with Hennebicq, 
he founded the Cercle universitaire de criminologie. Despite his liberal convictions he was a Catholic. See : joSePH-Marie jadot, 
“Jaspar, Henri”, in Biographie belge d’Outre-Mer (vol. 4), Bruxelles, Académie Royale des Sciences d’Outre-Mer 1968, 
p. 593-547 ; P. witMeur, “Henri Jaspar”, in JT 1949, col. 601 ; Pierre Henri, Grands avocats de Belgique, Bruxelles, 1984, 
p. 115-120 ; louiS de licHtervelde, “Jaspar, Henri”, in Biographie Nationale (vol. 31), Bruxelles, 1961, col. 480-491.
109. Not much is known about Maurice Duvivier. Archival sources indicate he was attorney-at-law in Brussels from 1892 to 
1933. Amongst his friends were Paul Spaak and Léon Hennebicq ; Archives of the City of Brussels, http://www.pallas.be/pls/
opac/plsp.getplsdoc ?lan=N&htdoc=general/opac_avb_n.htm (consulted on 26 February 2017).
110. René Vauthier was attorney and publisher. In his capacity as editor-in-chief of La Belgique Coloniale, one of Belgium’s 
most important periodicals on the CFS, he was invited to the inauguration of the Matadi-Leopoldville railroad in 1898 and 
afterwards explored Congo for three months. He defended strongly in King Leopold’s endeavour and in 1905, he became 
the vice president of the Congo Superior Court. See : M.-l. coMeliau, “Vauthier, René”, in Biographie coloniale belge (vol. 4), 
Bruxelles, Académie Royale des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, 1955, p. 906-907 ; “Conférence de Me René Vauthier au Jeune Barreau 
de Bruxelles”, in JT 1898, col. 1352.
111. “L’Angleterre et le Congo”, in JT 1904, col. 788 ; léon HenneBicq, “Insuffisance Parlementaire”, in JT 1906, col. 324.
1939)108 and colonial experts such as Félicien 
Cattier, Maurice Duvivier109 and the “champion of 
the colonial cause” René Vauthier (1864-1921)110. 
These young attorneys sparked the discussion on 
the take-over and an eventual annexation of Bel-
gium and positioned the Brussels Bar Association 
at the centre of colonial legal thinking.
After the turn of the century, international pro-
test against the policy of the CFS increased sig-
nificantly. Hennebicq profiled the Brussels Con-
férence du Jeune Barreau as the best forum to 
discuss the annexation problem of the Congo. 
In his opinion, Belgium’s parliament was a “tohu-
bohu d’ignorances” : a bunch of misconceptions 
about the Congo lived amongst MP’s since they, 
according to Hennebicq, only cared about elec-
toral gaining111. Since the establishment of the 
Société d’Études Coloniales, plenty of Brussels 
attorneys-at-law had expertise in the colonial 
matter. Their membership of the Young Bar Associ-
ation, made it the perfect environment to discuss 
the Congo question. It was Hennebicq who con-
tinued to develop commissions and sub-commis-
sions at the Brussels Bar Association.
At the end of February 1906, ten members of 
the Conférence du Jeune Barreau summoned the 
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General Assembly around the central topic 
“Le problème de l’annexion du Congo”112. 
Throughout the year, the Assembly convened sev-
eral times to discuss one particular question : did 
the annexation of Congo need to go as fast as pos-
sible and did another regime need to be installed ? 
The Assembly tackled four legal problems : taxes, 
freedom of commerce, revenues for Belgium and 
not for Congo, and land regime113. In relation to 
the humanitarian crisis, only forced labour was 
briefly mentioned.
At that same time, the Brussels Young Bar Asso-
ciation established a subdivision working on the 
colonial question : Section de Droit Maritime 
et de Droit Colonial (Section of Maritime and 
Colonial Law). A year later, in 1907, that Section 
established a study group of seven Brussels attor-
neys-at-law : the Commission d’Études Coloniales 
(Commission of Colonial Studies)114 with Léon 
Hennebicq as president115. The secretary of this 
sub-commission was Eugène Soudan. Systemat-
ically, this commission answered within a com-
parative framework116 questions raised by public 
opinion and the Colonial Commission of the Bel-
gian parliament which prepared the cession of the 
CFS to Belgium.117 Hennebicq cleverly used his JT 
and connections within the Conférence du Jeune 
Barreau de Bruxelles to bring himself at the front 
of the Congo debate. It was his strategy to respond 
vividly against critiques uttered by national and 
international voices.
112. The association’s statutes stipulated that in case more than ten members asked to convene, an extraordinary general 
assembly needed to be installed. See : “Conférence du Jeune Barreau de Bruxelles”, in JT 1906, col. 254.
113. “Conférence du Jeune Barreau de Bruxelles”, in JT 1906, col. 269.
114. “La loi coloniale”, in JT 1907, col. 334.
115. Other members were de Formanoir, Marcel Despret, Panis, Renault, Eugène Soudan and J. Van Ackere.
116. From a comparative point of view and with eleven questions, the policies in French, British, Dutch and German colonies 
were discussed. See : “Etudes préparatoires à la loi coloniale belge”, in JT 1907, col. 490-491.
117. victor renauld, “Rapport préliminaire sur la législation coloniale allemande”, in JT 1907, col. 491-494 ; joSePH van ackere, 
“Rapport préliminaire sur la législation coloniale allemande”, in JT 1907, col. 616-620 ; eugène Soudan, “Notes sur la loi 
coloniale néerlandaise”, in JT 1907, col. 817-824 ; léon HenneBicq, Marcel deSPret and FranciS wiener, “Rapport sur les colonies 
anglaises”, in JT 1907, col. 781-782 ; rené Marcq, “Notes sur les principes généraux de la législation coloniale française”, 
in JT 1907, col. 882-887.
118. léon HenneBicq, “L’annexion du Congo”, in JT 1903, col. 667.
Hennebicq heads for a polemical approach
From 1903 onwards, the Journal des Tribunaux 
opposed the British red rubber campaign. In these 
humanitarian debates, Léon Hennebicq saw a 
hidden agenda, aimed at “dismembering Congo 
and dividing it amongst Germany, England and 
France”118. Therefore, he openly criticised inter-
national humanitarian campaigns as “a screen to 
hide latent ambitions”. In his opinion, Belgium 
had become a competitor for the other European 
powers which needed to be restrained. Léon Hen-
nebicq continued that the Congolese take-over 
was necessary for Belgium if it wanted to establish 
a large commercial fleet.
The 1904 Casement Report, named after its drafter 
Roger Casement (1864-1916), set off a discussion 
in the British House of Commons, and public opin-
ion favoured stopping the atrocities. Almost unani-
mously, the House of Commons accused the govern-
ment of the CFS of infringements against humanity 
and freedom of commerce. On June 19, 1904 Jour-
nal des Tribunaux reported on these debates, but 
according to the author it was clear that this cam-
paign was motivated by commercial ambitions :
“The campaign conducted by Liverpool mer-
chants and embraced by the government 
did not address this issue. A policy of strong 
images and alleged spectacular atrocities gave 
the denouncing missionary reports an authen-
tic character and gained public opinion for 
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the cause. Therefore the different meetings, 
the Casement report and the voting in the 
House of Commons”119.
The Journal des Tribunaux assumed, like many 
Belgians, that the British outrage was inspired by 
“commercial appetites by a nation hungry for con-
quest”120. The CFS’s resourceful vastness made it a 
profitable region, and under the cloak of humanity 
and justice, Great Britain tried to regain the posi-
tion it lost to Antwerp in the trade on ivory and 
rubber. Prior to the Casement Report, Edmund 
Morel had already sought to damage the CFS and 
he sought support in the Chambers of Commerce 
in Liverpool, Manchester and London. The mer-
chants, however, had not been harmed directly, 
and their president Alfred Lewis Jones (1845-1909) 
did not support the allegations. Later on, the Brit-
ish showed little interest to trade in this region121.
The editors of Journal des Tribunaux sought and 
found flaws in Casement’s report, particularly in 
the Epondo case122. According to them, the British 
diplomat seemed to have forgotten about “the nat-
ural propensity of the negro to lie and the change 
of the truth by the missionaries”123. This “misin-
119. “La campagne menée par les commerçants de Liverpool et accueillie par le gouvernement ne parlait de cette dernière 
question. Il leur paraissait plus opportune de frapper l’imagination populaire et l’opinion publique par le spectacle d’atrocités 
prétendues auxquelles la fonction des missionnaires dénonciateurs donnait un caractère d’authenticité apparente. 
De là la campagne de meetings, le rapport Casement, les votes de la Chambre de Communes”. See : “La commission 
d’enquête au Congo”, in JT 1904, col. 1036. See also : StengerS, Charte Coloniale…, p. 63-64 and 67-68.
120. “L’Angleterre et le Congo”, in JT 1904, col. 789.
121. dean PavlakiS, British humanitarism and the Congo Reform Movement 1896-1913, Farnham, 2015, p. 153-154.
122. The Epondo Case was the only atrocity that Casement had the opportunity to investigate personally. Epondo was 
a Congolese boy whose hand was cut off because of failure to fulfil the rubber harvest quota. When the authorities of the CFS 
replied to this accusation, they produced evidence certified by an American missionary that Epondo’s hand had been bitten 
off by a wild boar. This news made many English doubt the validity of other parts of the report. See : louiS, Ends of British 
Imperialism ; The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonisation, London, 2006, p. 155.
123. “la propension naturelle du nègre au mensonge, et le travestissement de la vérité par les missionnaires ; La commission 
d’enquête”, in JT 1904, col. 1037.
124. Félicien cattier, Etude sur la situation de l’État Indépendant du Congo, Bruxelles, 1906, p. 10.
125. jean StengerS, “Janssens, Edmond”, in Biographie Nationale (vol. 31), Bruxelles, 1961, col. 474-480.
126. victor devaux, “Schumacher (de), Edmond”, in Biographie Coloniale belge (vol. 3), Bruxelles, Académie Royale 
des Sciences Coloniales, 1952, col. 793-796.
127. Nisco was an Italian attorney-at-law who had a brilliant career. At the end of the nineteenth century he left Italy and 
he became involved with the Congo Free State. He was the first Italian citizen to enter the Congolese judiciary at the Boma 
Court of Appeal. He left the judiciary because he could never obtain presidency of this Court. In 1904, he became member 
of the International Inquiry Commission. At the end of 1905 he returned to Italy. See : Fernand dellicour, “Nisco, Giacomo”, 
in Biographie Coloniale belge (vol. 4), Bruxelles, Académie Royale des Sciences Coloniales, 1955, col. 660-661.
formation” has led to the diplomatic problems for 
Belgium. Under international pressure, King Leop-
old II appointed a Commission d’Enquête (Inquiry 
Commission) in July 1904, which was fully sup-
ported by the Journal des Tribunaux.
Hennebicq hailed the King’s choice of “abso-
lute impartial members”124 and expected a lot 
from their research. Attorney-General at the Bel-
gian Court of Cassation Edmond Janssens (1852-
1919)125 presided this international Commis-
sion. The Journal des Tribunaux held him high 
in esteem as he “would not be guided by his 
emotions”. The Swiss chief justice of the Luzern 
canton Edmond de Schumacher (1859-1908)126 
and the Italian president ad interim of the Boma 
Court of Appeal baron Giacomo Nisco (1860-
1942)127 assisted as vice-president. Together with 
their assistants, the Commission travelled four 
and a half months through the Congo, held hear-
ings and took testimonies in different localities. 
It took months before the report was published. 
Its findings did not meet the expectations of Léon 
Hennebicq at all. The Commission condemned 
unanimously the Congo Free State for committing 
atrocities against its citizens.
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Generally, the Journal des Tribunaux kept silent 
about the Commission’s results and ignored the 
opportunity to rethink its position in the Congo 
debate. It was Henri Jaspar, at that time member 
of the editorial board128, who put his finger on the 
most sensitive problem : “They were numerous, 
those in denial and persuaded that the Commis-
sion would bring a certificate of good conduct and 
morality for the young [Congo Free] State”129.
Amongst those numerous people was the editor-
in-chief of the Journal des Tribunaux who must 
have felt betrayed by the Commission. In a way, 
Hennebicq and his fellows ignored the report as 
much as possible and diverted their focus on the 
question whether the annexation of the CFS could 
annul Belgium perpetual neutrality and even it 
existence as a state.
The Journal des Tribunaux on collision course
In 1906, Félicien Cattier130, a former trainee of 
Edmond Picard and thus a colleague of Léon Hen-
nebicq, published Étude sur la situation de l’État 
Indépendant du Congo131, an update of his book 
published about ten years earlier. In his new work, 
the attorney did not longer advocate the King’s 
colonial operations. However, he targeted less 
the humanitarian aspects of the Leopoldian reign 
then the fact that he had moved millions of Belgian 
francs (borrowed from the Belgian government) to 
128. vandenBogaerde, Vectoren van het recht…, p. 129.
129. “Nombreux étaient ceux qui, confiants en d’audacieux démentis, étaient persuadés que la Commission rapporterait 
de son voyage en terre nègre un certificat de bonne conduite et de moralité pour le jeune Etat”. See : Henri jaSPar, 
“Dignité nationale”, in JT 1906, col. 306-308.
130. See footnote 88.
131. Félicien cattier, Étude sur la situation de l’État Indépendant du Congo, Bruxelles, 1906.
132. Paul SPaak, “La fiente”, in JT 1906, col. 338-341.
133. Paul-Emile Janson belonged to a prominent political family : his sister, Marie Janson, was the first woman to be elected in 
the Senate and his nephew Paul-Henri Spaak took a leading role in multiple governments. Janson studied law at the Université 
Libre de Bruxelles where he met Henri Jaspar. They became good friends, even though they belonged to different political 
parties. Janson was Prime Minister of Belgium from November 1937 to May 1938. He eventually died in Buchenwald during 
the Second World War. See : ginette kurgan-van Hentenryck, “Janson, Paul-Emile”, in Nouvelle Biographie Nationale (vol. 11), 
Bruxelles, Académie Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts, 2012, col. 203-205.
134. For a biography, see : footnote 108.
135. Paul-eMile janSon, “Œuvre de moralité”, in JT 1906, col. 194-197.
136. As an answer to Cattier, he wrote the book Un méchant livre : les théories de Mr. Cattier. See : M.-l. coMeliau, “Vauthier, 
René”, Biographie coloniale belge (vol. 4), Bruxelles, Académie Royale des Sciences Coloniales, 1955, col. 906.
137. cattier, Étude sur la situation ; léon HenneBicq, “Un pamphlet anti-colonial”, in JT 1906, col. 210-214.
138. “Conférence du Jeune Barreau de Bruxelles”, in JT 1906, col. 1305.
personal accounts. Cattier’s book brought a shock 
and divided the Brussels attorneys in two large 
camps using the Journal des Tribunaux and the Bar 
Association as their arena132. Some attorneys, such 
as Paul Emile Janson (1872-1944)133 and Henri 
Jaspar134, hailed the work of their colleague and 
called out for an open, moral and public debate 
on the Congo question135. They denounced the the-
ory that violence and abuses were necessary in the 
Leopoldian colonial expansion and argued that, if 
Belgium was to inherit the Congo from its King, all 
must be done to wash away the humanitarian crisis. 
They hailed the parliamentary debate on the Congo 
annexation.
Others, such as Hennebicq and René Vauthier136, 
opposed these ideas strongly. They loathed Cat-
tier as an anticolonialist and antinationalist who 
played with fire. Hennebicq considered the book 
as inappropriate in a time when the Congo was 
threatened “by foreign ambitions” and Belgium 
found itself “on the brink of war with England, 
which wants to take our property in accordance 
with its traditional policy”137. England was the 
most important enemy, ready to invade the CFS 
and violating its independence for its own eco-
nomic welfare138. According to Hennebicq, Bel-
gium and King Leopold II had undeniably done a 
great job overseas. Yet, individual mistakes, such 
as torture or killings, were considered unavoida-
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ble in a colonial adventure. In addition, the editor-
in-chief accused Cattier of taking the easy route 
by mentioning the scandals in the CFS. Moreover, 
and still according to Hennebicq, Cattier had 
made terrible mistakes in his study, while had had 
ignored the fact that other colonial powers had 
adopted similar policies139. By doing so, Cattier 
had exposed himself as a “representative of the 
commercial societies” and as an “anglophile”. 
Even if Cattier urged for an annexation to Bel-
gium, Hennebicq could not consider him a Bel-
gian patriot, since his propositions would lead to a 
de facto annexation to England. For the editor-in-
chief, it was essential that CFS first received a clear 
legal status to guarantee the colonial occupation. 
The CFS was a legal entity with all rights to posi-
tion itself amongst other states and in the relation 
with the indigenous people140. From then on, the 
discussion in the Journal des Tribunaux escalated.
Leading figures such as Alphonse-Jules Waut-
ers (1845-1916)141 defended Cattier, who also 
responded in an open letter to Hennebicq’s 
accusations142. It resulted in a bitter discussion 
in which Hennebicq took the last word : “As for 
M. Cattier, I have only one obvious thing to say, 
I do not agree with him, and no one, not even 
him, has a monopoly on Justice and humanitar-
ian ideas”143. Another article, symptomatically 
entitled La fiente (bird droppings), illustrated 
139. For instance, Cattier compared Belgium’s colonial policy to the French, British and German. For Germany’s legislation, 
he discussed the legislation until 1896, henceforth omitting the evolutions afterwards, which were inspired by other colonial 
powers. For English law he discussed the British East Africa protectorate, which could not be compared to Congo.
140. “Le problème de l’annexion du Congo”, in JT 1906, col. 362.
141. Alphonse-Jules Wauters had studied geography and art criticism. Since the 1876 Geographic Conference in Brussels, 
he passionately defended the colonial policy of King Leopold II. In 1884 he established the Mouvement Géographique, 
a biweekly of which he was the only editor for almost 30 years. In those days, Wauters was considered to be the expert on 
the geography of the Congo basin. He further published several works on the Congo to vulgarize and propagate the project 
in Belgium. The polemic around the annexation of the Congo made Wauters a strong advocate of the immediate annexation. 
See : rené caMBier, “Wauters, Alphonse-Jules”, in Biographie Coloniale belge (vol. 2), Bruxelles, Académie Royale des Sciences 
Coloniales, 1951, col. 969-972.
142. Félicien cattier, “La question du Congo”, in JT 1906, col. 227-228.
143. “Quant à M. Cattier, je n’ai à répondre qu’une chose, qui est évidente, c’est que je ne suis pas de son avis et que personne, 
pas même lui, n’a le monopole de la justice et de l’humanité”. See : léon HenneBicq, “Correspondance”, in JT 1906, col. 228.
144. SPaak, “La fiente”, col. 338-341.
145. “Conférence du Jeune Barreau de Bruxelles”, in JT, 1908, col. 1128-1129 ; “Après l’annexion du Congo, les tâches 
nouvelles”, JT, 1908, col. 1157-1158.
the harsh debate amongst Brussels attorneys-at-
law. Two fictive attorneys, Jaspic and Hennebar, 
were overheard by their colleague in a discus-
sion on the CFS. For the one, King Leopold II had 
allowed terrible policies, whereas the other stated 
that the colonial endeavour had been a success. 
The author of the text suggested a middle way and 
argued that nothing is perfect. A colony could not 
be established without crimes against humanity, 
but the annexation was very needed to clean the 
mess the colonials had made144. This discussion 
was between Hennebicq and Jaspar, wherein the 
former acknowledged that a few bad apples had 
given the Congo Free State a terrible reputation. 
Jaspar adhered to the idea that abuses and torture 
were systematically applied in the overseas ter-
ritory. This article clearly illustrated the different 
opinions about the Congo debate at the Brussels 
Bar, although no one rejected the take-over.
On 20 August 1908, the Belgian Chamber of Dep-
uties voted to take-over the CFS as a Belgian col-
ony. The Senate followed suit a few weeks later, 
and from 15 November 1908, Belgium took over 
the Congolese administration. The work in Belgian 
Congo (1908-1960) really took off. New tasks 
waited : valorising the colony and ameliorating 
the lives of the indigenous145. In a sense this can 
be considered as a hidden confession that Belgian 
colonizers had not always done the right thing 
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in the CFS146. The neutrality question, which had 
risen during the five years prior to the annexation, 
moved in the Journal des Tribunaux to the back-
ground until the start of the First World War.
III. Belgian and Congolese neutrality 
at the eve of the First World War
Belgian neutrality
The persistence of controversy in 
international doctrine
In international doctrine, Arendt’s doubts and 
confusion could not be discarded. Heffter, whose 
Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart counted 
as a classic of 19th century international law – and 
thus of the period in which Belgian neutrality orig-
inated – used the Belgian case to demonstrate that 
“whereas every Nation has its own right, Europe 
has its rights as well, granted by the mere social 
order [between states] itself”147. Belgian sovereignty 
remained subjected to its international status.
What would be the consequence of a foreign 
invasion ? Franz von Liszt (1851-1919), Professor 
at the Humboldt University in Berlin, held the 
most traditional position before the outbreak of 
the First World War. In his view (1913), neutral-
ity was still constructed on the simple opposition 
between two belligerent parties and the neu-
tral state. The latter had to consider an ongoing 
146. On the administration of Congo, see recently : Pierre-luc PlaSMan, Léopold II potentat congolais, Bruxelles, 2017. 
External (British) pressure counted for many substantial changes in the original 1907 project of the Colonial Charter 
(the legislative act which would organise parliamentary and budgetary oversight of the Congo colony), which assumed 
Belgium’s sovereignty over the territories of the CFS. Government leader Schollaert surrendered to reformist pressures 
(Hymans, Vandervelde) by granting full parliamentary control on both administration and budget in order to obtain as broad 
a majority as possible. After the May 1908 elections, the socialist MP Royer managed to introduce an amendment stating that 
“no one can be compelled to work for the benefit of private individuals or companies”. See : StengerS, La Charte Coloniale…, 
p. 169-179 and 190.
147. auguSt wilHelM HeFFter, Le droit international public de l’Europe (transl. Jules Bergson), Berlin, 1857 (first edition 1844), p. 521.
148. Franz von liSzt, Das Völkerrecht systematisch dargestellt, Berlin 1913, (first edition 1898), p. 335. For the genealogy of 
this term, see : gaurier, Histoire du droit international, p. 295.
149. deScaMPS, Neutralité…, p. 436.
150. Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land, The Hague, 
18 October 1907, 205 CTS 299. See also : randall leSaFFer, “Peace through Law : the Hague Peace Conferences and the Rise 
of the Ius Contra Bellum”, in Maartje aBBenHuiS, cHriStoPHer erneSt BarBer and annaliSe r. HigginS (eds.), War, Peace and 
International Order ? The Legacies of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, London, 2017, p. 31-51.
conflict as res inter alios acta (a legal situation 
applicable only between third parties), and could 
maximize its profit by acting as medius in bello 
(the middleman in an armed conflict)148.
Of course, for Belgian doctrine, there could be 
no doubt on the nature of a German invasion of 
the metropolis. In 1902, Edouard Descamps had 
already described a potential attack as a “true 
crime of high international felony”.149 Descamps’s 
conception of pacigérat found a partial echo in 
the 1907 Hague Conventions. Convention V, 
dated 18 October 1907, stated in its first article 
that “the territory of neutral powers is inviolable” 
and phrased self-defence as the “punishment of 
violations of neutrality” (art. 5, in fine). Mention-
ing that “the fact of a neutral Power resisting, even 
by force, attempts to violate its neutrality, cannot 
be regarded as a hostile act” equally created the 
impression that Descamps’s concept of pacigérat 
had received both ratification and extension 
(art. 10).150 A neutral state invaded by an aggres-
sor would thus be regarded as a neutral power 
defending itself, and not as a belligerent.
Yet, this contradicted in part the internal policies 
supported by Leopold II, namely the construc-
tion of considerable fortifications in Antwerp and 
along the Meuse. If defence did not serve national 
independence, since permanently neutral states 
were considered helpless victims, to what object 
had these efforts been made ? Notwithstanding the 
Franz von Liszt, Das Völkerrecht systematisch dargestellt, Berlin 1898.
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development of doctrinal restraints on the use of 
force151, arguments were not lacking to support 
the thesis that neutrality ended at the first gunshot. 
A neutral state defending itself against aggression 
would become a belligerent, and had to count on 
its guarantors’ goodwill. Its fate would be depend-
ent on the outcome of the armed conflict.
Neutrality of the Congo
The significance of the 1885 Berlin Final Act
The importance of the Berlin Act has been either 
“grossly exaggerated” or consistently downplayed 
in historiography152. The neutrality introduced by 
articles 10 and 11 of the Berlin Final Act was, in 
the words of Louis Jozon, in no ways a “rigorous 
neutrality”, capable of ruling out armed con-
flict153. The signatory parties engaged themselves 
to use their best offices to submit quarrels to arbi-
tration. Yet, the ultimate recourse to armed force 
remained an option. We should however empha-
sise that this only concerned conflicts arising in 
the Congo itself.
The Congo Free State declared itself perpetually 
neutral by letter of Leopold II (1 August 1885)154, 
thereby fulfilling the condition posed by article 
10 that the perpetual neutrality of any state along 
the Congo river would be voluntary (and thus not 
151. agatHa verdeBout, “The Contemporary Discourse on the Use of Force in the Nineteenth Century : A Diachronic and 
Critical Analysis”, in Journal of the Use of Force and International Law, 2015, n° 2, p. 223-246.
152. MattHew craven, “Between Law and History : the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the logic of free trade” in 
London Review of International Law, 2015, n° 1, p. 33.
153. louiS jozon, L’état indépendant du Congo : sa fondation, ses principales manifestations de sa vie extérieure, ses relations 
avec la Belgique, Paris, 1900, p. 158.
154. jozon, Congo…, p. 153. For the text of the letter, see : American Journal of International Law, 1909, n° 1, p. 26.
155. williaM roger louiS, “The Berlin Conference and the (Non-)Partition of Africa”, in louiS, Ends of British imperialism, 
p. 113. See also : eMile de laveleye, “La neutralité du Congo”, in Revue de droit international et de legislation comparée,, 1883, 
p. 254-262 ; jan vanderSMiSSen, “The King’s Most Eloquent Campaigner : Emile de Laveleye, Leopold II and the creation of 
the Congo Free State”, in Journal of Belgian History, 2011, n° 1-2, p. 7-57.
156. jozon, Congo…, p. 151.
157. Guarantee and neutrality are not necessarily linked in a congenital way, as in the Belgian 1830-1839 case. 
See : deScaMPS, Neutralité…, p. 524.
158. deScaMPS, Neutralité…, p. 527. Concerning Van Eetvelde’s reticence to cite the Berlin Act in further reforms of the Congo 
State, see : Note to Leopold II, 21 June 1901, quoted in jean StengerS, Elaboration de la Charte…, p. 53.
159. Treaty of Cession and Annexation between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Independent State of the Congo, 
28 November 1907, American Journal of International Law, n° 1, p. 73-75 and 206 ; CTS 17 ; jean StengerS, Belgique et Congo : 
l’élaboration de la Charte coloniale, Bruxelles, 1963 ; roBert Senelle and éMile cléMent, Léopold II et la Charte coloniale 
(1885-1908) : de l’État indépendant du Congo à la colonie belge, Wavre, 2009.
imposed)155. The role of the signatory parties was 
addressed in article 11, stating that they ought 
to provide “good offices” in order to ensure that 
in case one of the guaranteed territories was 
involved in an armed conflict, these territories 
could be placed under the regime of neutrality, 
“for the duration of the war”, and “with the com-
mon consent of this power and one or another of 
the belligerent powers”156. This did not imply a 
hard guarantee to defend the Congolese territories 
157. Even if a violation of the Berlin Final Act could 
count as a pretext for the other signatory powers 
to intervene, there was no explicit mechanism to 
enforce its validity158.
Yet, the take-over of the Congo by Belgium in 
1907-1908159 created a second set of potential 
conflicts, originating in Europe, and thus not in 
Africa. In this case, Congo would form part of the 
Belgian territory involved in a war. Article 12 of 
the Berlin Final Act did not exclude the transfer 
of armed operations to Africa : in case serious 
dissent would arise among the signatory parties, 
they obliged themselves to have recourse to medi-
ation by one or several friendly powers. In the 
same vein, the voluntary recourse to arbitration 
was open to them. Again, these provisions did not 
preclude the use of force, but sought to limit it by 
codifying the centuries-old practice of interstate 
diplomacy and mediation. In Jozon’s words :
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“[...] this article is not awfully embarrassing 
for the signatory powers. It does not do any-
thing else than compel them to try a tentative 
of reconciliation. If they desperately desire 
war, they can bypass this mediation”160.
The 1908 take-over of the Congo by Belgium : 
Liszt and Oppenheim
Liszt went the furthest in his application of classical 
legal thinking. According to this German author, 
the 1907-1908 incorporation of the Congo by the 
Belgian state had created an unprecedented event, 
causing a fundamental change in the nature of the 
circumstances underpinning the Treaty of London 
of 1839. Liszt applied the contested legal figure of 
the clausula rebus sic stantibus, or the unwritten, 
implied clause in international treaties causing their 
automatic end when the underlying configuration 
conducive to the conclusion of the treaty ends. 
This legal phenomenon is only rarely accepted in 
civil law, e.g. in the hyperinflation under the Wei-
mar Republic, when devaluation had wiped out 
the balance between payment and sold goods.
Liszt did not allow the application of this principle 
for all treaties, but only for those concluded “with 
regards to a specific factual situation, whereby its 
continuation is conditional on the very existence 
of this situation”. The annexation of Congo by Bel-
gium, in Liszt’s eyes, counted as a fundamental 
alteration of the object guaranteed by the Great 
Powers in 1839. Liszt declined a general applica-
tion of this principle, leading to a potential unrav-
160. jozon, Congo…, p. 152.
161. “[…] auf einen bestimmten tatsächlichen Zustand und unter Vorauszetsung seiner Fortdauer […] Wenn ein Staat dem 
andern seinen Besitzstand garantiert hat, so kann der Garantievertrag einseitig gekündigt werden, wenn durch eine Vergrößerung 
des Staatsgebietes des garantierten Staates, etwa durch die Erwerbung eines ausgedehnten Kolonialbesitzes, die von dem 
garantierenden Staate übernommenen Verpflichtungen wesentlich erhöht würden”. See : liSzt, Das Völkerrecht, p. 170-171. 
Contra (“risky theory”) : e. nyS, Le droit international : les principes, les théories, les faits (vol. 2), Bruxelles, 1912, p. 533.
162. On the quarrel between Leopold II and the political world, see : jean StengerS, L’action du Roi…, p. 131-132.
163. “Belgian Congo has a distinct legal personality from the metropolis.” See : Art. 1, law of 18 October 1908 on 
the government of Belgian Congo, M.B. 19-20 October 1908 ; deScaMPS, Neutralité…, p. 514.
164. geert lelouP, Non pas un pouvoir illusoire : ontstaan, rol en (on)macht van het Belgische Rekenhof (1814-1939) (Studies in 
Belgian History, 2), Brussels, 2016 and id., ““Fait accompli”, de controversiële controle van de Congolese Financiën (1885-1914)”, 
in : Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire/Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis, 2015, n° 2, p. 487-531.
165. HeFFter, Le droit international…, p. 225
166. liSzt, Das Völkerrecht…, p. 157.
elling of the international legal order (pacta sunt 
servanda), but thought it applicable in the case 
of guarantee treaties : when a state has guaran-
teed another state’s holdings, the guarantee treaty 
could be cancelled unilaterally, if an extension 
of the state territory of the guaranteed state, for 
instance through the acquisition of an extended 
colonial holding, significantly increased the obli-
gations undertaken by the guarantor161.
The take-over (“reprise”)162 by the Belgian govern-
ment had created a distinction between the 
metropolis and the administration of the colony163. 
This way, budgetary and political risks were kept 
separate, at the insistence of the political elite. 
In practice, financial transfers between both enti-
ties were common164. Moreover, in international 
law, as argued inter alia in Heffter’s Le droit inter-
national de l’Europe, the distinction between 
metropolis and colony was irrelevant165. Both 
were part of the national territory and risked being 
involved in an armed conflict166.
Lassa Oppenheim (1858-1919), a German-born 
professor of international law at Cambridge, sup-
ported Liszt’s view in his magnum opus Interna-
tional Law : A Treatise (1912) :
“[...] the region of war depends upon the bel-
ligerents […]. Since colonies are a part of the 
territory of the mother country, they fall within 
the region of war in the case of a war between 
the mother country and another State, what-
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ever their position may be within the colonial 
empire they belong to”167.
The neutralization of Congo required an explicit 
convention between belligerents, whereby they 
agreed to limit the theatre of war168. This left of 
course the choice to belligerents to unilaterally 
decide not to invade part of their opponent’s ter-
ritory169. But they could never be compelled to 
do this170. The Belgian historian Jacques Wille-
quet (1914-1990) classified the Belgian Congo 
among the explicit German war objectives in 
1914, rendering the latter possibility illusory : for 
the Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Ministry), 
two options were to be envisaged. First, an agree-
ment with France and Britain provided for a gen-
eral reshuffle in Africa. Second, a military conflict 
could bring conquests171. Although these doctrinal 
positions might sound harsh, they found support 
in diplomatic practice. Belgian proposals for the 
neutralization of Congo required the participation 
of the other Great Powers (under the Berlin Act), 
or of the belligerent in case of a conflict originat-
ing in Europe172.
Descamps did not consider the voluntary and 
optional nature of article 10, and eagerly assim-
ilated the protection granted to the Congo basin 
to the status of Belgium itself. At the time of pub-
lication of Descamps’ essay (1902), the Congo 
Free State had not yet been absorbed by Belgium. 
167. laSSa oPPenHeiM, International Law : a treatise (vol. 2), London/New York, 1912, p. 86. On Oppenheim, 
see : MattHiaS ScHMoeckel, “Lassa Oppenheim (1815-1919)”, in jack BeatSon and reinHard ziMMerMan (eds.), Jurists Uprooted : 
German-Speaking Émigré Lawyers in Twentieth-Century Britain, Oxford/New York, 2004, p. 583-599.
168. liSzt, Völkerrecht, p. 297-298 ; Oppenheim, International Law (vol. 2), p. 87.
169. See : oPPenHeiM, International Law (vol. 2), p. 87. Another example is the neutralisation of the Southern Netherlands 
in 1733, when France (belligerent in a conflict with Emperor Charles VI) promised the Dutch Republic not to invade the 
Austrian Netherlands lest Charles VI would invade France from there. See : Banning, Les origines et les phases, p. 11-15 ; 
Frederik dHondt, Balance of Power and Norm Hierarchy : Franco-British Diplomacy after the Treaty of Utrecht 
(Legal History Library, 17/Studies in the History of International Law, 7), Leiden/Boston, 2015, p. 478-485.
170. jonatHan e. HelMreicH, “The End of Congo Neutrality, 1914”, The Historian, 1966, n° 4, p. 617.
171. jacqueS willequet, Le Congo Belge et la Weltpolitik (1894-1914), Bruxelles/Paris, 1962, p. 425. This in spite of Emperor 
Wilhelm II’s apathy towards Africa. See also : jacqueS arMand wulluS-rudiger, La Belgique et l’équilibre européen : 
documents inédits, Paris, 1935, p. 47-48.
172. Page, Africa and the first World War, p. 3. See also : willequet, Le Congo Belge, p. 412-416.
173. deScaMPS…, La neutralité, p. 340.
174. Idem, p. 527.
175. “un contrat synallagmatique parfait” [a perfect reciprocal contract] (Idem.., p. 310).
His work could however preventively state that 
“the applicability of Belgian neutrality ought to be 
limited to the family of the same, or a similar civi-
lisation to ours”173.
Yet, Descamps linked aggression in Congo to a 
direct violation of the “droit européen” : since 
all major powers were a party to the Berlin Act, 
an attack on the Congo Free State or a subse-
quently annexed Belgian colony, would result in 
the same consequences as an attack on Belgian soil 
itself under the 1839 Treaty of London174. In both 
hypotheses, the Great Powers would be immedi-
ately involved. In this sense, the separate discussion 
of the neutrality of the Congo Free State under the 
Berlin Act seemed almost senseless from the Great 
Powers’ point of view. British fears that an annex-
ation of Congo would amount to an enlargement 
of its guarantee, limited to the European continent, 
seemed to contradict this position.
The key to resolving this question is the wording of 
the Berlin Act. Article VII of the Treaty of London 
imposes a clear obligation to guarantee Belgium’s 
independence, as a counterpart for the observance 
by the guaranteed party of her duties under the 
laws of neutrality175. By contrast, article 13 of the 
Berlin Act imposes mediation by a friendly power ; 
article 11 good offices. This does not exclude the 
used of armed force in fine, when these options 
would appear as exhausted. Where does the 
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 “positive obligation”176 to provide good offices 
end ? To this effect, Descamps counted on the 
impossibility for any European power to decline 
a mediation effort, helped by “the necessities of 
politics” to complement legal guarantees.177
Any researcher trying to pin down the legal status of 
Belgian neutrality should pierce the veil of secrecy 
and venture into diplomatic correspondence. 
Conformably to the deep structure of the sources 
of international law178, the “writings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations” 
only have a supplementary value. Only subsequent 
state behaviour explains vague treaty clauses, such 
as article VII of the 1839 Treaty of London. There 
again, interstate negotiations consider the neu-
trality of Belgian Congo as political and optional, 
never as mandatory. The late British recognition 
of Belgium’s absorption of the Congo in 1913 was 
entirely tied to the limited engagement undertaken 
by Gladstone’s government in 1870 : the British 
guarantee was meant to cover European territory, 
not overseas possessions. Hence, the take-over of 
the Congo Free State by Belgium necessitated a 
new explicit consent by the British guarantor179.
176. Idem, p. 525.
177. Idem, p. 527.
178. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Geneva, 13 December 1920, art. 38, (1) 6 LNTS 379.
179. Mary elizaBetH tHoMaS, “Anglo-Belgian Military Relations and the Congo Question, 1911-1913”, The Journal of Modern 
History, 1953, n° 2, p. 165 ; Memorandum by Hurst, London, 22 January 1907, published in kennetH Bourne, d. caMeron 
watt and MicHael Partridge (eds.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs (part I, series G, vol. 24), [Bethsheda], 1987, p. 3-4 ; 
Hardinge to Grey, Annual Report 1908, Brussels, 22 January 1909, ib.(part I, series F, vol. 4-6), p. 277 ; Memorandum 
Respecting the Affairs of the Congo, s.d., ib. (part I, series G, vol. 24), p. 330-334. See also : Frantz deSPagnet, Cours de droit 
international public (ed. Charles de Boeck), Paris, 1910, p. 180, arguing for the internationally contentious nature of Belgium’s 
takeover of the Congo Free-State, or cHarleS duPuiS, Le droit des gens et les rapports des grandes puissances avec les autres 
états, Paris, 1921, p. 182, who required the consent of the guarantors before a perpetually neutral state acquired a colony.
180. jonatHan e. HelMreicH, “Belgian Concern over Neutrality and British Intentions, 1906-1914”, in Journal of Modern History, 
1964, n°. 4, p. 416-427.
181. jozon, Neutralité…, p. 154.
IV. Conclusion
Permanent neutrality, as established in 1839, was 
never extensively defined. The growing interna-
tional regulation of the status never remained at 
the mercy of armed conflict180. Irrespective of a 
country’s status as belligerent or neutral power 
defending its status, the factual risk of aggres-
sion could never be ruled out. The Great Power 
guarantee attached to Belgium’s national territory 
was strictly limited to its European borders, as the 
1870 guarantee conventions rightly illustrate. The 
intervention of France, Britain, Russia, Austria and 
Germany (Prussia) could only be triggered by an 
attack on Belgian soil. The pacifist overtone in 
Descamps’s writings did not liberate Belgium from 
the conventional obligation to render its neutrality 
credible and invest in defence.
As far as the Congo was concerned, the signa-
tory parties to the Berlin Act had “engaged them-
selves to respect the declared neutrality on behalf 
of article 10, but did not engage themselves to 
enforce it on third parties” (our emphasis)181. 
Even if an explicit guarantee clause was lacking, 
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the basis on which the colony could be protected 
resided more in ‘good faith’ than in the parties’ 
actual commitment182.
From the formal abolition of permanent neutral-
ity183 to the Pact of Locarno, Belgium shook off its 
neutral attire, to the benefit of an entirely novel 
legal order set up at the Versailles Peace Confer-
ence. The League of Nations created a collective 
system of security184. This legal order was val-
ue-driven, just as the medieval theory of bellum 
iustum, which precluded neutrality185. Parties to 
the Covenant of the League of Nations vested their 
confidence for the settling of international dis-
putes in the League’s Council (art. 15) and in the 
newly created Permanent Court of International 
Justice (art. 13). Edouard Descamps presided over 
the prestigious committee of international lawyers 
that drew up the Court’s statute, including the 
famous article 38 (1), listing the sources of interna-
tional law according to which the Court ought to 
examine pending cases186. Moreover, the adoption 
of the Briand-Kellogg Pact seemed to consecrate 
pacifist theories187.
Nevertheless, during the conflict, the King of the 
Belgians and his government opted for the use of 
‘neutrality’ as a rhetorical and political advantage, 
allowing for an even-handed position in negotia-
tions with both belligerent camps. Albert I (1875-
1934) saw himself as the defender of Belgian 
integrity and independence188. His son, Leopold 
182. deScaMPS, Neutralité…, p. 529.
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de la Société des Nations (Organisation internationale et relations internationales, 77), Bruxelles, 2014 ; aBBenHuiS, An Age of 
Neutrals…, p. 8. On the implications for maritime – classical – neutrality : eric ScHnakenBourg, “La fin d’une illusion ? Le droit de 
la neutralité à l’épreuve de la Première Guerre Mondiale”, in Relations internationales, 2015, n° 160, p. 3-18.
185. League of Nations Covenant, Versailles, 28 June 1919, 25 CTS 188. On Belgium’s role in the League, see : Henri rolin, 
La politique de la Belgique dans la Société des Nations, Genève, 1931.
186. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Geneva, 16 December 1920, 6 LNTS 379.
187. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Paris, 27 August 1928, 94 LNTS 57. 
BernHard roScHer, Der Briand-Kellogg-Pakt von 1928. Der “Verzicht auf den Krieg als Mittel nationaler Politik” 
im völkerrechtlichen Denken des Zwischenkriegszeit, Baden-Baden, 2004.
188. Maria de waele, Naar een groter België (vol. 1)…, p. 151-200 ; jan velaerS, Albert I : koning in tijden van oorlog en crisis, 
1909-1934, Tielt, 2009, p. 250-379.
189. jan velaerS and HerMan van goetHeM, Leopold III : de koning, het land, de oorlog¸ Tielt, 1994, p. 54-63 ; cHarleS Henry 
Hyde, “Editorial Comment : Belgium and Neutrality”, in American Journal of International Law , 1937, n° 1, p. 81-85.
III (1901-1983), used the failure of the League of 
Nations system to opt for a policy of ‘independ-
ence’ (indépendance/zelfstandigheid), which 
could be assimilated to classical, pre-19th-century, 
voluntary neutrality.189
The Journal des Tribunaux of the Belle Époque 
offers a unique glance on how an intellectual 
elite was divided on the Congolese question. 
As founder of an apolitical periodical, Edmond 
Picard kept aloof of political discussions, although 
he referred to the Congo debate when the Journal 
de Tribunaux reported on the Society in favour of 
colonial expansion. Only when Hennebicq took 
over as editor-in-chief, a clear rise in the attention 
for the Congo debate is noticeable. Contrarily to 
his predecessor, Hennebicq did not have a polit-
ical career and his publications were mostly lim-
ited to what he wrote for the Journal des Tribunaux. 
He did use the journal and his connections at the 
Brussels Bar Association to take a lead in the dis-
cussion. He intended by his polemical approach 
to influence the parliamentary work and to pro-
file the Journal des Tribunaux as a vector of law. 
Taking the number of lawyers who were mem-
bers of Parliament at that time, one can assume 
the influence of Hennebicq and the Journal des 
Tribunaux was significant. Despite its editor-in-
chief’s convictions, the journal’s pages revealed 
not a single, but multiple visions on the role of 
the Congo Free State and the Congo as a colony. 
The journal nourished itself with the general and 
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established discourse of 19th-century international 
law. Not necessarily in conformity with the ‘Great 
Civilizer of Nations’”, but always with the national 
interest at heart.
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